3 ms·

I think it's proof that security (and privacy) doesn't matter. So it is very relevant. (As if telegram as competitor isn't enough proof.) The entirety of the s

I think it's proof that security (and privacy) doesn't matter. So it is very relevant. (As if telegram as competitor isn't enough proof.) The entirety of the signal "stack" depends on the SGX enclave. The fact that no one, in all time, has bothered to notice that the running code is different than the published code, is telling. There's actually a newer SGX exploit, and related mitigation, that came to light at about the same time when they released their discovery protocol. Those mitigations were never backported to the base signal functionality. That no one audited and complained about this says quite a lot. I've not looked at this code dump but perhaps the newer fixes finally made their way in. Or have been there all along.

ajconway 6y ago
> The fact that no one, in all time, has bothered to notice that the running code is different than the published code It’s client apps who verify (via attestation) that the code inside an SGX enclave is what they expect it to be, and clients are open source. > The entirety of the signal "stack" depends on the SGX enclave Only private contact discovery depends on trusting SGX.
- jiveturkey 6y ago
  > It’s client apps who verify (via attestation) that the code inside an SGX enclave is what they expect it to be, and clients are open source. If the attestation signature matches the published enclave code, then we can know if there's a match. So either there's a missing mitigation, which no one ever has complained about, or the running enclave code doesn't match the source, which also no one ever has complained about. Without independent audit, there is no verification and we have established that independent parties do not care. > Only private contact discovery depends on trusting SGX. uh, no. this is demonstrably and obviously wrong.
  - feanaro 6y ago
    > uh, no. this is demonstrably and obviously wrong. Yes? How?
  - tylersmith 6y ago
    Then please demonstrate.

ajconway 6y ago

> The fact that no one, in all time, has bothered to notice that the running code is different than the published code It’s client apps who verify (via attestation) that the code inside an SGX enclave is what they expect it to be, and clients are open source. > The entirety of the signal "stack" depends on the SGX enclave Only private contact discovery depends on trusting SGX.

jiveturkey 6y ago
> It’s client apps who verify (via attestation) that the code inside an SGX enclave is what they expect it to be, and clients are open source. If the attestation signature matches the published enclave code, then we can know if there's a match. So either there's a missing mitigation, which no one ever has complained about, or the running enclave code doesn't match the source, which also no one ever has complained about. Without independent audit, there is no verification and we have established that independent parties do not care. > Only private contact discovery depends on trusting SGX. uh, no. this is demonstrably and obviously wrong.
- feanaro 6y ago
  > uh, no. this is demonstrably and obviously wrong. Yes? How?
- tylersmith 6y ago
  Then please demonstrate.