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This is a hobby interest of mine but switching alarm systems off to do a quick bit of work has caused at least three radiological accidents in irradiation facil
by YeGoblynQueenne 6y ago
This is a hobby interest of mine but switching alarm systems off to do a quick
bit of work has caused at least three radiological accidents in irradiation
facilities in Nesvizh, Belarus, in Soreq, Israel and in San Salvador, El
Salvador. You can find the details in IAEA reports:
The one in Nesvizh:
https://www.iaea.org/publications/4712/the-radiological-accident-at-the-irradiation-facility-in-nesvizh https://www.iaea.org/publications/4712/the-radiological-acci...
The one in San Salvador:
https://www.iaea.org/publications/3718/the-radiological-accident-in-san-salvador https://www.iaea.org/publications/3718/the-radiological-acci...
The one in Soreq:
https://www.iaea.org/publications/3798/the-radiological-accident-in-soreq https://www.iaea.org/publications/3798/the-radiological-acci...
In each case the facility operator entered the irradiation chamber after
switching off safety mechanisms (such as alarms or mechanisms placing the
radiation source in a safe position, inside a pit) in order to unblock the
conveyor system from packages that had become lodged in the mechanism. These
facilities usually have a conveyor system that takes packages of products like
food or medicine around a radiocative source to be sterilised. The packages seem
to have a tendency to get stuck in the conveyor mechanism's parts often at which
point proper procedure is to power everything down before someone can enter the
facility to service the mechanism. Obviously that causes severe delays to
production and obviously people simply override this procedure, that is in place
to protect them. They go into the facility, they find the source in an active
position and become irradiated.
My favourite of the bunch above is the one in Nesvizh, where the irradiation
facility was built like a miniature maze from D&D, lacking only the guardian
minotaurs with double axes (or Ogres, I guess). The radiation chamber was an
actual maze, like a square spiral of concrete. The way to the source at the
center of the maze was littered with pressure sensors that triggered alarms and
there was even a moving hatch at the entrance that exposed a pit too deep and
long to jump over. IAEA's investigation never found out how the operator managed
to cross the pit, navigate the maze and get to the center of the chamber without
triggering any alarms that would have normally stored the source to its safe
position inside a dry pit, but he sure did it, then realised suddendly that the
source was in the active position and ran back out. He died later of radiation
poisoning before having the chance to tell anyone how he managed the feat.
- cerved 6y agothank you
- luma 6y agoAre lockout/tagout controls not used in these systems? Industry has (mostly) solved this problem long ago.
- ansible 6y agoYep, it was through incidents like these that we developed Lockout Tagout: https://www.osha.gov/control-hazardous-energy https://www.osha.gov/control-hazardous-energy
- baybal2 6y agoYou cannot "switch off" a cobalt 60
- YeGoblynQueenne 6y agoThere was a key in the radiation chamber's control panel that turned the power to the chamber on and off. This key had to first be turned to the "off" position, then carried to the entrance of the maze to activate the panel that slid the section of floor over the pit towards the entrance, thus allowing er entrance. It seems this procedure took too long so the operator only turned the key to "off" in the main control panel, then crossed the pit at the maze entrance on his own. In my comment above I say they don't know exactly how he crossed this pit with the mechanical hatch, but I seem to have misremembered. The motor that moved the hatch was inside the pit and he could have stepped on it and jumped over to the far side. What the IAEA doesn't know is how he managed to cross a pressure plate after the pit that would have normally stored the source to its safe position.