But wait, doubting an identity (or its objective basis) is a bit different from doubting "something matters to them", flat-earth beliefs can matter to someone.

But wait, doubting an identity (or its objective basis) is a bit different from doubting "something matters to them", flat-earth beliefs can matter to someone. > Doubting them would imply I knew them better than they know themselves Not exactly. Doubting something is different from contradicting it, i.e. asserting the opposite. I can doubt the moon is made of cheese without asserting that it isn't, for example. Also, self-diagnosis is a problem, to the extent that medical professionals would warn against it even among themselves. There is a difference between "knowing oneself" and being able to diagnose oneself - diagnosis necessarily requires an abstraction/regressive step beyond subjective experience. It's one thing to subjectively identify, describe oneself as asexual/aromantic - it's another to treat this as if it was an objective clinical category, and "educate" people about it as such. Now this maybe leads to a larger discussion that I probably don't have the qualification to participate in: what is a diagnosis/pathology/condition versus regular personality differences and traits, and what/why are the implied social entitlements for things categorised as such. > when someone tells me they identify as $X, acceptance is rational only so far as "all progress depends on the unreasonable man" -- https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/536961-the-reasonable-man-adapts-himself-to-the-world-the-unreasonable https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/536961-the-reasonable-man-a... alternatively, you needn't accept anything, but just avoid those discussions if they are unproductive.