I don't think Bostrom is getting the sample space right in his original argument. One base reality versus potentially many simulated realities isn't the relevan

I don't think Bostrom is getting the sample space right in his original argument. One base reality versus potentially many simulated realities isn't the relevant measure. First, you have to consider all possible realities. We at least assume, if we're in a base reality, we're in one where at least one civilization developed after about 13 billion years or so and it has the ability to run computational simulations, though not even close to simulating a sentient animal brain. We can at least eliminate base realities where that never happens in trying to figure out which we're in. What about past that? Assuming we're in base reality, how many futures result in becoming able to simulate sentient brains? How many possible presents contain other civilizations? How many time slices of our universe, if it is a base reality, contain more simulated observer moments than non-simulated? How do you even begin to answer that? It isn't nearly as simple as Bostrom is making it seem. If some base reality civilization gains the ability to simulate but only has the computational capacity to try and trick Rick Sanchez into giving up the secret to making an interdimensional portal, that is several hours worth of one animal's observer moments versus however many some large number I don't know how to express worth of animal observer moments in base reality. There may need to be far, far more simulations than just "more than one" before the relative mass of simulated observer moments gets anywhere near the mass of real observer moments.