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The US would not allow Egypt to become part of the Warsaw pact either, yet Soviet support somehow made that situation different. >the US and the entire rest of

The US would not allow Egypt to become part of the Warsaw pact either, yet Soviet support somehow made that situation different. >the US and the entire rest of NATO would 1000% get involved They didn't for the Suez Canal crisis, the US broadly sided with the USSR against France and the UK. >all means necessary would be used to keep control of the Bosphorus strait. Much like the Suez Canal, they never had control over the straits. A treaty regulated both civilian and military vessels that allowed the USSR access. Reinforcing my point, that their treatment wouldn't have changed with a canal too.

sudosysgen 6y ago
>The US would not allow Egypt to become part of the Warsaw pact either, yet Soviet support somehow made that situation different. The US wouldn't have had the ability to prevent that from happening if somehow the USSR and Egypt and most Arab countries supported it. For Turkey however, it's very different, as it's much easier for the NATO to project power into Turkey than for the USSR and because willingness is much higher. >They didn't for the Suez Canal crisis, the US broadly sided with the USSR against France and the UK. Yes, but that wouldn't have happened if instead of the Suez Canal it was also the Bosphorus Strait, for which being into NATO hands completely prevented the USSR from becoming a naval power, which may very well have changed the course of history. >Much like the Suez Canal, they never had control over the straits. A treaty regulated both civilian and military vessels that allowed the USSR access. Reinforcing my point, that their treatment wouldn't have changed with a canal too. This is simply very false. Not only did the treaty limit what kind of ships the USSR could pass through for military reasons, most importantly the presence of the strait meant that in the case of a war against NATO it is impossible to defend the passage without an invasion of Turkey. Obviously, the treaties would not mean anything in a hot war.
- boomboomsubban 6y ago
  >as it's much easier for the NATO to project power into Turkey than for the USSR and because willingness is much higher. This doesn't make any sense. It's easier for a distant foreign power to project power than a neighboring country? And the distant nation would be more willing than the neighbor? >Not only did the treaty limit what kind of ships the USSR could pass through for military reasons, Or "regulated military access." >for which being into NATO hands completely prevented the USSR from becoming a naval power, Both Soviet submarines and aircraft carriers were usually allowed through, the symbols of post war naval power. >in the case of a war against NATO it is impossible to defend the passage without an invasion of Turkey. War with NATO meant Turkey was at war, or that a NATO member was the aggressor in which case Turkey may reconsider their position. Your entire point seems to be that the US placed a much higher value on Turkey than Egypt already. I find that hard to accept given how they sided with Egypt during the Suez Canal crisis but were immediately willing to sell out Turkey during the Cuban Missile crisis. Either way, I'd still describe the treatment they received "similar" as my original post claimed.
  - sudosysgen 6y ago
    >This doesn't make any sense. It's easier for a distant foreign power to project power than a neighboring country? And the distant nation would be more willing than the neighbor? Turkey had very high, even overwhelming military involvement in politics. The US had incredibly high involvement in the Turkish military as a result of NATO. As a result, in the case of such a war the US would have been able to force a coup, or at the very least cause a split in the military. Indeed, the US had a very high degree of control over Turkey during the cold war, and it had really cemented US alignment in the actual power structures. >Both Soviet submarines and aircraft carriers were usually allowed through, the symbols of post war naval power. Soviet aircraft carriers had to be seriously gimped in order to be classified as "heavy missile cruisers" and allowed passage. >Your entire point seems to be that the US placed a much higher value on Turkey than Egypt already. I find that hard to accept given how they sided with Egypt during the Suez Canal crisis but were immediately willing to sell out Turkey during the Cuban Missile crisis. Either way, I'd still describe the treatment they received "similar" as my original post claimed. The US did not sell out Turkey during the CMC. Indeed, the ICBMs that the US had recently developped made the missiles in Turkey no longer useful, and they weren't under Turkish command to begin with.
    - boomboomsubban 6y ago
      >. The US had incredibly high involvement in the Turkish military as a result of NATO. This doesn't make it easier for them to project power there, they invested more into projecting power there. It's still far easier for a bordering state, and if Turkey had ever hinted at altering the strait agreement the USSR likely would have spent more projecting power there. Really, I have no idea what your point is anymore. Nothing you've said has suggested that Turkey, Syria, and Iraq would have been occupied for the past century if they had a canal. I only brought up NATO to demonstrate that the countries already held strategic importance.

sudosysgen 6y ago

>The US would not allow Egypt to become part of the Warsaw pact either, yet Soviet support somehow made that situation different. The US wouldn't have had the ability to prevent that from happening if somehow the USSR and Egypt and most Arab countries supported it. For Turkey however, it's very different, as it's much easier for the NATO to project power into Turkey than for the USSR and because willingness is much higher. >They didn't for the Suez Canal crisis, the US broadly sided with the USSR against France and the UK. Yes, but that wouldn't have happened if instead of the Suez Canal it was also the Bosphorus Strait, for which being into NATO hands completely prevented the USSR from becoming a naval power, which may very well have changed the course of history. >Much like the Suez Canal, they never had control over the straits. A treaty regulated both civilian and military vessels that allowed the USSR access. Reinforcing my point, that their treatment wouldn't have changed with a canal too. This is simply very false. Not only did the treaty limit what kind of ships the USSR could pass through for military reasons, most importantly the presence of the strait meant that in the case of a war against NATO it is impossible to defend the passage without an invasion of Turkey. Obviously, the treaties would not mean anything in a hot war.

boomboomsubban 6y ago
>as it's much easier for the NATO to project power into Turkey than for the USSR and because willingness is much higher. This doesn't make any sense. It's easier for a distant foreign power to project power than a neighboring country? And the distant nation would be more willing than the neighbor? >Not only did the treaty limit what kind of ships the USSR could pass through for military reasons, Or "regulated military access." >for which being into NATO hands completely prevented the USSR from becoming a naval power, Both Soviet submarines and aircraft carriers were usually allowed through, the symbols of post war naval power. >in the case of a war against NATO it is impossible to defend the passage without an invasion of Turkey. War with NATO meant Turkey was at war, or that a NATO member was the aggressor in which case Turkey may reconsider their position. Your entire point seems to be that the US placed a much higher value on Turkey than Egypt already. I find that hard to accept given how they sided with Egypt during the Suez Canal crisis but were immediately willing to sell out Turkey during the Cuban Missile crisis. Either way, I'd still describe the treatment they received "similar" as my original post claimed.
- sudosysgen 6y ago
  >This doesn't make any sense. It's easier for a distant foreign power to project power than a neighboring country? And the distant nation would be more willing than the neighbor? Turkey had very high, even overwhelming military involvement in politics. The US had incredibly high involvement in the Turkish military as a result of NATO. As a result, in the case of such a war the US would have been able to force a coup, or at the very least cause a split in the military. Indeed, the US had a very high degree of control over Turkey during the cold war, and it had really cemented US alignment in the actual power structures. >Both Soviet submarines and aircraft carriers were usually allowed through, the symbols of post war naval power. Soviet aircraft carriers had to be seriously gimped in order to be classified as "heavy missile cruisers" and allowed passage. >Your entire point seems to be that the US placed a much higher value on Turkey than Egypt already. I find that hard to accept given how they sided with Egypt during the Suez Canal crisis but were immediately willing to sell out Turkey during the Cuban Missile crisis. Either way, I'd still describe the treatment they received "similar" as my original post claimed. The US did not sell out Turkey during the CMC. Indeed, the ICBMs that the US had recently developped made the missiles in Turkey no longer useful, and they weren't under Turkish command to begin with.
  - boomboomsubban 6y ago
    >. The US had incredibly high involvement in the Turkish military as a result of NATO. This doesn't make it easier for them to project power there, they invested more into projecting power there. It's still far easier for a bordering state, and if Turkey had ever hinted at altering the strait agreement the USSR likely would have spent more projecting power there. Really, I have no idea what your point is anymore. Nothing you've said has suggested that Turkey, Syria, and Iraq would have been occupied for the past century if they had a canal. I only brought up NATO to demonstrate that the countries already held strategic importance.