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There's a balancing act. Historically Android would just provide a list of what permissions each app wants, and you either take it or leave it. That's transpare
by tialaramex 6y ago
There's a balancing act. Historically Android would just provide a list of what permissions each app wants, and you either take it or leave it. That's transparent in a sense, if researchers care they can do the analysis and produce a paper, "Hey, 80% of the top X apps request permission Y which they have no Earthly reason to need" - but almost no end users will read this boring technical stuff to make decisions. See also pre-Baseline Requirements "class based" X.509 certificates. Adding more permissions to this list is easy... but also has almost no effect. There's a good chance you've never looked at the permissions you granted most apps you have.
In the modern era some of these abilities also require an explicit grant of permission when used. Location is an example we've all seen.
But that incurs fatigue so it has to be used cautiously. For example Android could ask if apps are allowed to use the Network, but you'd likely get sick of that really quickly, so instead you can explicitly disable network access for an app if you want, but it doesn't ask "Can Daily-quiz-app-1234 access the network?" when you run it.
One option Google has that's more extreme than a fatigue-inducing prompt, is to just refuse permission anyway, which is what's happening here.
And unlike iOS, an Android phone can run other browsers, but for a modern browser on a nice phone you want WebAuthn. If any app can just say "I'm actually a web browser" then WebAuthn's phishing protection blows away when you install some Flappy Bird clone to try it out - the app just tells the OS it's a web browser, comes up with some excuse as to why you should touch your fingerprint sensor, and it says to the OS it's browsing https://your-bank.example/ https://your-bank.example/ so it gets credentials for your bank. So in this case Google manages some high risk permissions only for known safe developers. Mozilla's public Firefox builds have this "I'm really a web browser, I get to do WebAuthn" permission, but if you build the exact same source and sideload it, it can't do WebAuthn.
[Apps all get the same, likewise unphishable, feature on capable phones, Android or iOS, but without this "web browser" permission it's fixed so that they can't ask for credentials for a web site, only for their own app]
- f6v 6y ago> There's a balancing act. Historically Android would just provide a list of what permissions each app wants That's one of the many design choices that made truly filthy apps possible on Android. I worked on a device monitoring(wink) app back in the day(which I'm not proud of). The things we did there...Installing apps without an app store, hiding application icon(!), recording phone calls(!!!), reading messages(!!!). And all of that was done using official APIs on a non-rooted device.
- izacus 6y agoIt also made truly powerful apps possible as well. Apps which allowed innovation without asking our corporate overlords for permission to exist. Funny to see people on hacker news demand that some OS capabilities be only allowed to corporations themselves and noone else.
- BenjiWiebe 6y agoWhat we wish, is that the permissions would be fully customizable by the end user.
- ryandrake 6y agoPermissions are something I wish desktop os’s would adopt. In most systems, any rando application I run has access to every computer resource that I as a user have access too! Depending on the system, this could mean: my personal documents, my desktop folder, my downloads, all attached peripherals, including microphones and cameras, serial and parallel ports, any radios including WiFi and Bluetooth, the network, a list of running processes, a list of installed applications, the clipboard, and on and on. Why on earth should this be the default? As a user, I should be able to easily deny any application access to these things. This made a little sense when you could trust application developers with access to all these things, but that ship has long since sailed.
- pjmlp 6y agomacOS and Windows have them, the problem is the uphill battle to get them adopted.
- amluto 6y agoWhy would access to the fingerprint sensor give the ability to forge WebAuthn signatures? An app being able to detect that the phone’s user has their finger on the sensor does not in any way compromise the security of a different app doing the same thing. Obviously one could write a malicious browser that implements WebAuthn wrong and compromises users who register with a site using that browser. This leads to discussions about WebAuthn attestation, and there are valid arguments there both ways.
- tialaramex 6y ago> Why would access to the fingerprint sensor give the ability to forge WebAuthn signatures? It wouldn't? No apps get access to the fingerprint sensor, it's very hard to imagine any legitimate purpose for that, and easy to imagine hostile use cases. The operating system doesn't give access to the fingerprint sensor, it provides an API for doing FIDO (the underlying technology to deliver WebAuthn) and the fingerprint sensor is used by the operating system to provide User Verification for that. The API takes a parameter for the Relying Party Identifier. For most phone apps, you can't control this, it'll be set to an ID for your app, which you can discover and fill out in your server backend. This way your app can authenticate your users to your servers, but other apps can't imitate it. But for WebAuthn the RPID is based on the DNS name of the web site, so a web browser needs a way to actually set this value or it can't do WebAuthn. Hence, Android needs an extra permission flag to authorise legitimate web browsers to set the RPID while preventing untrustworthy apps from doing so.
- amluto 6y agoThis sounds like a mediocre design. An entirely separate key hierarchy per app would avoid any possibility of confusion signatures with those generated by another app, even if both apps were web browsers.
- voussoir 6y ago> so instead you can explicitly disable network access for an app if you want Some OEMs provide this feature in their firmware, but many/most do not. Users have to resort to running local VPNs like NetGuard. Even ADB can't do it: "Permission android.permission.INTERNET requested by com.android.vending is not a changeable permission type". If you know a way, please share! I understand permission fatigue but this lack of control is, to me, blatantly user-hostile.