So I actually went and found this fabled 245-page report : https://transportation.house.gov/imo/media/doc/2020.09.15%20FINAL%20737%20MAX%20Report%20for%20Publi

So I actually went and found this fabled 245-page report : https://transportation.house.gov/imo/media/doc/2020.09.15%20FINAL%20737%20MAX%20Report%20for%20Public%20Release.pdf https://transportation.house.gov/imo/media/doc/2020.09.15%20... And this, I think, is where the whole faulty/flawed thing gets introduced : > Faulty Design and Performance Assumptions. > Boeing made fundamentally faulty assumptions about critical technologies on the 737 MAX, most notably with MCAS. Based on these faulty assumptions, Boeing permitted MCAS—software designed to automatically[...] It also expected that pilots, who were largely unaware that the system existed, would be able to mitigate any potential malfunction. Boeing also failed to classify MCAS as a safety-critical system, which would have attracted greater FAA scrutiny during the certification process.[...] So, I would agree that Boeing's design flaw here was not alerting the pilot with a huge red warning light (and being cheeky about re-certification). But I don't think that this report goes so far as to say that the airframe was flawed and therefore necessitated MCAS.