If a security product/ supposedly trusted projects code loses some company's secrets or hurts somebody, nobody cares whether it was a single bad day, a mishap i

If a security product/ supposedly trusted projects code loses some company's secrets or hurts somebody, nobody cares whether it was a single bad day, a mishap if you will or something that could have been forseen. The data is now in bad hands, peoples lives are disturbed. Everything else is basically just talk until _proven_ otherwise. FreeBSD really dodged the ball at the last minute here. Would you employ somebody for work on a security product that obviously behaved as a maniac, basically robbed his own family of savings and landed together with his wife in prison for years? Is this person that good that there was literally nobody else to ask? It seems, Donenfeld at al. did a good job in 1-2 weeks porting code to FreeBSD, it may be better quality than the Macy's quasi-original developed over months of work. (Some of the code seems to have been rather similar to a differently licensed code elsewhere.) * Ok, so Donenfeld maybe is right, maybe he just dropped an extra s in an _email_. * The buffer overflow was quite spectacular. A network professional in a security product should handle jumbo frames. Maybe there are other less obvious and maybe less spectacular overflows elsewhere. This one just hit Jim Salters eye (grep). Btw. how would you feel about somebody basically doing your trademark (Wireguard in this case) a bad reputation? I could understand it, if Donenfeld took it personally. It seems though, he didn't. Macy on the other hand wouldn't admit to the poor quality of the software he wrote until pressured with clear evidence and even then he couldn't fully swallow his ego. Ars Technica/ Jim Salter did some great journalism here. It goes way beyond the quality of the average article even at Ars and that is a very decent bar. Yes, Wireguard is great, Donenfeld and friends have done a tremendous job over the years.