4 ms·
I don't see why 1) is unlikely - people that work with bats have antibodies to bat (corona)viruses already, and we know that even in a vacuum people often have
by sudosysgen 6y ago
I don't see why 1) is unlikely - people that work with bats have antibodies to bat (corona)viruses already, and we know that even in a vacuum people often have very mild symptoms or no symptoms at all. It's even more likely since the virus was probably not adapted to human hosts initially.
2) is also likely, for some viruses it took years and years, sometimes even more than a decade to find the actual intermediate animal.
4) is unlikely because further analysis cannot produce a likely scenario. If the virus was from an animal source known to the lab, we would know already, and if it was due to a gain-of-function experiment, it would be quite unlikely for the virus to take so much time to adapt to humans (it still hasn't fully done so), and there is still a lot of function to be gained. Besides, there is no obvious marker for genetic engineering (the furin cleavage sites are perfectly well described by both 1 and 2), and the fact the virus does not seem to be at a local optima yet indicates that it's probably not the result of engineering by repeated selection.
- fendy3002 6y agoThat point 1 is interesting. Got any articles/papers?
- sudosysgen 6y agoHere is an interesting one on the subject : https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6178078/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6178078/ They found 2.7% seropositivity simply for people living near bat colonies. There is also this event in mine workers that handled bats and bat dropping : https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpubh.2020.581569/full https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpubh.2020.5815... All in all, antibodies to bat coronaviruses to people in contact with bats are quite common.
- analyte123 6y agoIt's not "quite unlikely" for a virus to adapt to humans when you are digging through a lab archive of wild coronaviruses and injecting mice that express human proteins with them to see how sick they get. For example the president of EcoHealth, which sponsored bat coronavirus research at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, raved in November 2019 about all the exciting work they were doing filtering bat coronaviruses and even recombinant viruses for ones that look like they could infect humans and infecting humanized mice with them [1]. Researchers at the same lab published a study in 2017 where they tested the infectivity of 8 artificial coronaviruses (having been edited with 8 different spike proteins) on primate and human cell lines [2]. [1] https://twitter.com/PeterDaszak/status/1197631383470034951?s=20 https://twitter.com/PeterDaszak/status/1197631383470034951?s... [2] https://journals.plos.org/plospathogens/article?id=10.1371/journal.ppat.1006698 https://journals.plos.org/plospathogens/article?id=10.1371/j... "Rescue of bat SARSr-CoVs and virus infectivity experiments"
- sudosysgen 6y agoHmm, that is not quite what I said. If it did come from this research, which is being done openly with the help of many international collaborators, I don't understand how this could have happened without the virus being known to many more people, especially given the amount of time that passed from the first human infection to detection (which was enough for it even reach Europe!). It would be very surprising for no one else to know about it whereas normally such results are shared quite rapidly. This is why the very person you quoted, and other people that were involved in such research that live outside of China, find the theory of a lab escape from this kind of research exceedingly unlikely.
- analyte123 6y agoThe conflict of interest on their part is obviously massive. And given what we know about asymptomatic transmission and the minor symptoms in many young, healthy people, it could be weeks or longer from the initial infection (wherever it was) until anybody noticing anything unusual.
- sudosysgen 6y agoLikely, no one would notice anything unusual at all for months. The WIV simply doesn't hide samples for long enough for this to be a likely scenario. By the way, it's estimated there's multiple hundred infections by novel coronavirus pathogens in China every year. So why would the much lower number of viral escapes be considered beyond it when we have the additional constrait of the sample not having been shared with anyone, whereas normally this is done?
- analyte123 6y agoDid they immediately publish the details of every gain-of-function coronavirus experiment they ever did, or does it sit in a notebook or a private database for some period of time? A lag time of 4-6 weeks seems reasonable here, not 6 months. There still seems to be room for a natural origin, but to say a lab escape is completely impossible because one of maybe a dozen people (or less) would have been both willing and able to be a whistleblower doesn't seem right.
- 2-tpg 6y ago> If the virus was from an animal source known to the lab, we would know already Unless they started commanding to destroy samples, and sharing sequences of captured bats after the pandemic started. > it would be quite unlikely for the virus to take so much time to adapt to humans All experts agree that SARS-COV-2 is extremely adapted to human infection. Like it appeared out of nowhere, not the gradual result of a natural spill-over. To pose: "It could have been even more infectious" as an argument against gain-of-function is not very strong. And if we agree that China did not deliberately release a finished product, it would be weird to see optimal adaptivity. > there is no obvious marker for genetic engineering Gain-of-function does not create obvious marker. It is known possible to increase GoF of coronavirus using techniques that produce no markers at all. It is also tying it too closely to engineered bioweapons (vanilla SARS-COV is a bioweapon itself, even if collected from civet cats by terrorists), because the lab leak could also have been from a collected sample and accidental escape. There is no genetic engineering there at all.
- Ploskin 6y ago> Unless they started commanding to destroy samples, and sharing sequences of captured bats after the pandemic started. Which is exactly what they started doing back in February (2020). The two labs in Wuhan were ordered to destroy all samples they had. So even if the theory were to turn out to be the most likely origin, we'd have no way to find out for sure.
- sudosysgen 6y ago>Unless they started commanding to destroy samples, and sharing sequences of captured bats after the pandemic started. The pandemic started months after first escape, and the WIV shares research findings internationally. By the time the pandemic was detected, it was way too late to destroy samples, months already went by. And that's assuming the escape happened as soon as the samples reached the WIV, which is very generous. >All experts agree that SARS-COV-2 is extremely adapted to human infection. Like it appeared out of nowhere, not the gradual result of a natural spill-over. To pose: "It could have been even more infectious" as an argument against gain-of-function is not very strong. And if we agree that China did not deliberately release a finished product, it would be weird to see optimal adaptivity. It is now, but it wasn't at first zoonosis. It took months for the virus to ramp up to an epidemic, whereas clearly the current iteration of the virus can do so much faster especially in dirty environments. Besides, the virus is still, one year in, nowhere near maximum adaptivity, with significantly more infectious variants still appearing. It's not that it could have been more infectious, is that it now is significantly more infections. As far as "deliberately releasing a finished product", there is no reason for it to matter - the last iteration of a given strain will be subject to experimentation for a long time. Moreso, SARS-CoV-2 clearly has an insanely high potential for zoonosis, as we've seen it infect an incredibly large cross section of animals. This is not what you would expect from a virus that previously was only ever in one species and that was engineered to be specifically adapted to humans only. >Gain-of-function does not create obvious marker. It is known possible to increase GoF of coronavirus using techniques that produce no markers at all. It is also tying it too closely to engineered bioweapons (vanilla SARS-COV is a bioweapon itself, even if collected from civet cats by terrorists), because the lab leak could also have been from a collected sample and accidental escape. There is no genetic engineering there at all. You're stretching the definition of bioweapon way beyond any reasonable definition. Both SARS-CoV and SARS-CoV-2 make really poor bioweapons, many naturally occuring viruses are far superior. If the lab leak was from a collected sample that accidentally escaped, you would again expect it to be of known origin - China could point to a specific source and say "Hey, we found it, it comes from here!", and likely collaborators would know about it. Additonally, if it came from GoF, you would expect it to find and expend single-base-pair mutations with a high impact on pathogenicity already, yet we still had many crop up.