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That’s not right at all. Lies are false statements about your own knowledge. Even if the fact your lying about happens to be true, you are still lying about you

by simonh 6y ago

That’s not right at all. Lies are false statements about your own knowledge. Even if the fact your lying about happens to be true, you are still lying about your knowledge of it. It’s important to distinguish between the act of lying, the intended result of the lie and the relationship to the true facts. Those are all independent things. You can’t “fail to lie”, though you can fail to deceive with your lie. Suppose my daughter is accused of stealing the sweets. I might lie by saying I saw her in the garden at the time they were taken. Even if she was actually in the garden then, and didn’t take the sweets, I’m still lying about my knowledge of these things because I didn’t see her in the garden. Even if I lie about remembering something, such as that I saw her in the garden (maybe it was a long time ago), and it turns out I did see her in the garden I’m still lying because I didn’t recall the memory when I said I did. >“If what you say is accidentally true, then you tried to lie but failed.” No, because you still misrepresented your own knowledge. You did not deceive someone with your lie and maybe led them to the truth, but it was still a lie.

13415 6y ago
I was presenting Andreas Stokke's theory, insofar as I remember it from personal conversation. He is a professor at Uppsala University now and started out his approach with a publication in the Journal of Philosophy. I used to defend your view in private conversations (thanks to a misconception by Augustinus) but have been successfully converted by him and many others. However, you seem to be awfully certain of your position and present it with apodeictic certainty. If you're really interested in the topic, I recommend Meibauer (ed.): The Oxford Handbook of Lying as a reading. You'll see that your view is far less accepted than you think it is, but feel free to correct that by publishing papers about it. I've never followed up on it, but as always in philosophy the controversy never ends. As I've said, I disagree with Andreas a bit about the nature of such theories. In my view, they are in the end arbitrary, based on conflicting "intuitions." Still, I think that upon sincere reflection everybody should be able to convince him-/herself that his definition is better than yours.
- simonh 6y ago
  Interesting rabbit hole. I don't think that's quite Stokke's theory, in particular he doesn't seem to think that the fact you are lying about must be true. That's the falsity condition, which doesn't come from Stokke although some others argue for it. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/lying-definition/ https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/lying-definition/ In fact the first parts of both definitions proposed by Stokke are just more formal versions of the definition I gave. "You lie if and only if you say that p, you believe that p is false..." It's a false statement about your own knowledge. That's essential. As Stokke says “you lie when you assert something you believe to be false”. The greater rigor lies in violation of the violation of conversational norms and the purpose of the communication, which certainly seems correct to me. So while my definition and explanation were not complete, they seem to be consistent with Stokke. The addition of the falsity condition seems to be contested. An attempted lie which is actually (unintentionally) relating the truth is apparently called a palter. I don't find that convincing, it's still a false statement about your knowledge so would meet Stokke's criteria at least as given in the article I found. I'd say it's a class of lie. Maybe he changed his mind later.
  - 13415 6y ago
    No, I doubt he changed his opinion. You're totally right, I misremembered a personal conversation with him where we discussed this principle. Quite embarrassing! It appears that I would defend the traditional falsity condition, like others do, too, and that was probably even part of our disagreement. Regarding the "palter", I'm pretty sure he defended that this is not a lie. But after my misrepresentation of his position you definitely shouldn't take my word for it. This is not my line of work anyway, in my opinion you can define these concepts as needed relative to a more encompassing theory or purpose, and it doesn't make much sense insisting on one definition over the other. For instance, I believe in a legal context a lie could be defined very differently than for purposes of a moral theory. Regarding the everyday use, I find the version with the falsity condition I've presented above the most compelling.

by simonh 6y ago

13415 6y ago

I was presenting Andreas Stokke's theory, insofar as I remember it from personal conversation. He is a professor at Uppsala University now and started out his approach with a publication in the Journal of Philosophy. I used to defend your view in private conversations (thanks to a misconception by Augustinus) but have been successfully converted by him and many others. However, you seem to be awfully certain of your position and present it with apodeictic certainty. If you're really interested in the topic, I recommend Meibauer (ed.): The Oxford Handbook of Lying as a reading. You'll see that your view is far less accepted than you think it is, but feel free to correct that by publishing papers about it. I've never followed up on it, but as always in philosophy the controversy never ends. As I've said, I disagree with Andreas a bit about the nature of such theories. In my view, they are in the end arbitrary, based on conflicting "intuitions." Still, I think that upon sincere reflection everybody should be able to convince him-/herself that his definition is better than yours.

simonh 6y ago
Interesting rabbit hole. I don't think that's quite Stokke's theory, in particular he doesn't seem to think that the fact you are lying about must be true. That's the falsity condition, which doesn't come from Stokke although some others argue for it. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/lying-definition/ https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/lying-definition/ In fact the first parts of both definitions proposed by Stokke are just more formal versions of the definition I gave. "You lie if and only if you say that p, you believe that p is false..." It's a false statement about your own knowledge. That's essential. As Stokke says “you lie when you assert something you believe to be false”. The greater rigor lies in violation of the violation of conversational norms and the purpose of the communication, which certainly seems correct to me. So while my definition and explanation were not complete, they seem to be consistent with Stokke. The addition of the falsity condition seems to be contested. An attempted lie which is actually (unintentionally) relating the truth is apparently called a palter. I don't find that convincing, it's still a false statement about your knowledge so would meet Stokke's criteria at least as given in the article I found. I'd say it's a class of lie. Maybe he changed his mind later.
- 13415 6y ago
  No, I doubt he changed his opinion. You're totally right, I misremembered a personal conversation with him where we discussed this principle. Quite embarrassing! It appears that I would defend the traditional falsity condition, like others do, too, and that was probably even part of our disagreement. Regarding the "palter", I'm pretty sure he defended that this is not a lie. But after my misrepresentation of his position you definitely shouldn't take my word for it. This is not my line of work anyway, in my opinion you can define these concepts as needed relative to a more encompassing theory or purpose, and it doesn't make much sense insisting on one definition over the other. For instance, I believe in a legal context a lie could be defined very differently than for purposes of a moral theory. Regarding the everyday use, I find the version with the falsity condition I've presented above the most compelling.