This kind of analysis assumes the price would go that high if people had winterized their equipment. The price only went that high because the grid had basicall

This kind of analysis assumes the price would go that high if people had winterized their equipment. The price only went that high because the grid had basically already failed. It's extremely unlikely it would go that high if the grid was functioning. So the incentive to get that payout only exists if the grid falls over anyway. Basically this either allows smaller actors (who can't prevent the crises) to take a bet with long odds and a large payout (already not a winner as far as infrastructure investments go), or it basically removes its own incentive if enough of the larger actors take steps to avoid it. Basically I think this idea of ultra-high pricing during a crisis providing an incentive to prepare for one (as opposed to paying for the capacity to that the crisis doesn't occur in the first place), is not necessarily well-formed: it's feels like it's assuming the market remains efficient in one half while it also requires that the market has effectively failed due to the crisis we're trying to structure the market to prevent.