3 ms·
The interesting thing about TLS state machine bugs is that they seem hard to prove nonexistence of ahead of time. Look at gotofail: https://www.imperialviolet.
by astrange 6y ago
The interesting thing about TLS state machine bugs is that they seem hard to prove nonexistence of ahead of time.
Look at gotofail: https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/02/22/applebug.html https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/02/22/applebug.html
You can find it if you have a generic "suspicious looking code" check. And you can find it if you have a protocol regression test. But do you have a model of TLS that proves incorrect code paths like this don't exist?
- dochtman 6y agoWe have some documentation on what we've done to learn from previous vulnerabilities: https://docs.rs/rustls/0.19.0/rustls/manual/index.html https://docs.rs/rustls/0.19.0/rustls/manual/index.html We try very hard to model our code as a constrained state machine that closely follows the specification.
- astrange 6y agoThat looks good. For your amusement I remembered another state machine bug in an SSH implementation: https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2018/10/17/serious-ssh-bug-lets-crooks-log-in-just-by-asking-nicely/ https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2018/10/17/serious-ssh-bug-... It included some server states in the client state machine, so if a client sent the server its own "authentication successful" message it… just let them in.