3 ms·
How is it that Operating Systems don't default to a configuration that can't ever be changed by a rogue application process? Why can't the OS be write protecte
by mikewarot 6y ago
How is it that Operating Systems don't default to a configuration that can't ever be changed by a rogue application process?
Why can't the OS be write protected? Why can't the configuration also be write protected?
- slang800 6y agoUsers need to be able to edit the same files that ransomware encrypts, and differentiating between a legitimate user and a ransomware program is difficult.
- mikewarot 6y agoIf the backups are made by the system, and the user can't access them, and the system protects itself (and the backups, obviously)... ransomware shouldn't be possible. No matter what the application does, it can't access the backups in such a system.
- chefkoch 6y ago> If the backups are made by the system, and the user can't access them, and the system protects itself (and the backups, obviously)... ransomware shouldn't be possible. And if the gang get's admin rights on the box your backups are gone.
- Ajedi32 6y agoThat's a much higher bar to clear, particularly if end-users don't have admin access to their workstations.
- kemotep 6y agoEspecially since the user is the one being tricked into executing the ransomware.
- mikewarot 6y agoWhy does the user have access to the backups?
- chefkoch 6y agoIf you are an enterprise, they will try to get admin credentials so they can crypt everything, even domain controllers.
- kemotep 6y agoI was speaking in the context of the files, not the backups. How is this program to know that a file edited by the virus to encrypt is legitimate or not when the edit is being made by a user that created and owns those files? The backups themselves can be contaminated months before the encryption and ransomware attack is sprung. Restoring from last week or last month's backup might still lead to your system being encrypted. Additionally, as the other user pointed out the goal would be to gain access to the appropriate user with the level of permissions, such as an admin or root account, and use those credentials to carry out the attack.
- PeterisP 6y agoThe OS, files and configuration which can be unchangeable are trivially replaceable and thus does not really need to be protected. The configuration and data which gets changed all the time is valuable (the effort that was made in making those changes) and the prime target of ransomware, and it can't be write-protected because, well, it needs to get changed. I mean, if "reimage all these computers to the default configuration" would be a viable solution, everybody would just do that instead of paying large ransoms.
- mikewarot 6y ago>The OS, files and configuration which can be unchangeable are trivially replaceable and thus does not really need to be protected. Precisely the wrong way to think about this. If the OS can't protect itself, you've got a system with zero security.
- PeterisP 6y agoWell, that's true, OS being able to protect itself is useful and necessary, but my point is that it's nowhere near sufficient (as your parent post seems to imply) for preventing consequences of ransomware attacks, because by the time standard OS protections (which are reasonable) are broken because attackers have privileged access, they can also do worse things than just attack the single computers' OS, and if they can't get privileged access, well, then the OS is effectively write-protected anyway unless you're using something totally outdated. IMHO if the OS and its configuration would be securely write-protected (perhaps from media that's physically read-only?) that wouldn't help much if at all. It won't prevent lateral movement through the network (that's often memory only, no need to write to disk), it won't prevent persistence through theft of credentials or kerberos tickets (and possibly make it harder to rotate credentials), and of course it won't prevent the exfiltration, encryption and/or destruction of the actually valuable data. If we look at an advanced ransom attack (e.g. as many described in this article - manually operated after initial access like many Emotet attacks, not some purely automated malware) then I struggle to imagine what parts of the attack would be thwarted if the OS and config would be write protected - do you have something specific in mind?
- WalterBright 6y agoEmbedded systems can have their software burned into ROMs. It can't be corrupted. But nooooo, people put it into EEPROMs with a software write-enable switch.