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> the Bush I administration gave them categorical assurances that the borders of NATO would not move "an inch Eastward." Where you are quoting from? As far as

by older 6y ago

> the Bush I administration gave them categorical assurances that the borders of NATO would not move "an inch Eastward." Where you are quoting from? As far as I know such promises were never given and not even discussed at that time.

ivan_gammel 6y ago
Here’s more information on this topic, unfortunately only in Russian (you can use Google Translate): https://ru.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Вопрос_о_существовании_договорённости_о_нерасширении_НАТО_на_восток https://ru.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Вопрос_о_существовании_догов...
w0de0 6y ago
A better source than Russian Wikipedia: https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2017-12-12/nato-expansion-what-gorbachev-heard-western-leaders-early https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2017...
Someone 6y ago
https://www.spiegel.de/international/world/nato-s-eastward-expansion-did-the-west-break-its-promise-to-moscow-a-663315.html https://www.spiegel.de/international/world/nato-s-eastward-e...: After speaking with many of those involved and examining previously classified British and German documents in detail, SPIEGEL has concluded that there was no doubt that the West did everything it could to give the Soviets the impression that NATO membership was out of the question for countries like Poland, Hungary or Czechoslovakia. On Feb. 10, 1990, between 4 and 6:30 p.m., Genscher spoke with Shevardnadze. According to the German record of the conversation, which was only recently declassified, Genscher said: "We are aware that NATO membership for a unified Germany raises complicated questions. For us, however, one thing is certain: NATO will not expand to the east." And because the conversion revolved mainly around East Germany, Genscher added explicitly: "As far as the non-expansion of NATO is concerned, this also applies in general." Shevardnadze replied that he believed "everything the minister (Genscher) said." Edit: https://books.openedition.org/ceup/2759?lang=en https://books.openedition.org/ceup/2759?lang=en says: In the session with Baker on February 9, 1990, Gorbachev discussed various forms of German unification and association with NATO. Although he could not accept it publicly, he agreed with Baker’s argument that the presence of U.S. troops in Europe was a factor in overall European stability, which implicitly meant accepting the idea of Germany’s eventual membership in the Western alliance. It was during this conversation that Baker offered Gorbachev guarantees (that is the word used in the Russian memorandum of conversation—garantii) that NATO would not “spread an inch eastward,” and the Soviet leader accepted the statement as sufficient on the basis of the trust he felt had been built between him and the U.S. leadership—never asking for a written pledge. Gorbachev’s reasoning could partially be explained by the domestic dilemma he faced: how could he tell the Politburo that he had asked for written guarantees that NATO would not expand to the territories of the Warsaw Pact while the Pact was still in existence? That would have meant he had already accepted the idea that the socialist alliance was on its deathbed. In this conversation, Baker was not trying to mislead Gorbachev in any way; he was merely expressing the official position of the U.S. government at the time, which was fully shared by other Western leaders, talking specifically about the NATO presence on East German soil, but by implication also about any future expansion. However, the Bush administration would change that position very soon—without providing any notification to Gorbachev.
- older 6y ago
  So, basically, someone said something in discussions but no documents were signed?
  - ClumsyPilot 6y ago
    Do you think every sensitive political matter is documented and triple - stamped?
  - MichaelMoser123 6y ago
    I was wondering about that; if Nato not exanding to the east was imortant, then why didn't the Soviet Union insist to put it into an agreement? I guess it's not quite possible to put such a future commitment of not expanding Nato into writing; as there is no legal mechanism to enforce it.
    - Someone 6y ago
      As the quote I pasted says: “Gorbachev’s reasoning could partially be explained by the domestic dilemma he faced: how could he tell the Politburo that he had asked for written guarantees that NATO would not expand to the territories of the Warsaw Pact while the Pact was still in existence? That would have meant he had already accepted the idea that the socialist alliance was on its deathbed” A good diplomat might have phrased that differently, without removing too much content, though, so that the Warschau pact wouldn’t lose face from it. Maybe something along the lines of that the two parties recognized each other’s spheres of influence? (Or maybe that wasn’t something either party was willing to commit to?)
      - MichaelMoser123 6y ago
        don't know about that argument, they could have insisted to put that commitment into some kind of secret amendment, but wikipedia says that these are no longer practiced; well, who knows, wikipedia also says that there are exceptions to this rule. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secret_treaty#Decline_in_modern_times https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secret_treaty#Decline_in_moder...
AlexCoventry 6y ago
This is the citation in The Folly and the Glory: > Mary Elise Sarotte, “Not One Inch Eastward? Bush, Baker, Kohl, Genscher, Gorbachev, and the Origin of Russian Resentment Toward NATO Enlargement in February 1990,” Diplomatic History 34, no. 1 (January 2010): 119–40. Sarotte fought for, and won, the declassification of key documents cited in this chapter, and she is the leading scholar on the question of NATO expansion. Key conversations between the Bush administration and Gorbachev are in a 2017 National Security Archive briefing book, “NATO Expansion: What Gorbachev Heard,” https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//dc.html?doc=4325680-Document-06-Record-of-conversation-between https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//dc.html?doc=4325680-Document-06-....

by older 6y ago

ivan_gammel 6y ago

Here’s more information on this topic, unfortunately only in Russian (you can use Google Translate): https://ru.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Вопрос_о_существовании_договорённости_о_нерасширении_НАТО_на_восток https://ru.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Вопрос_о_существовании_догов...

w0de0 6y ago

A better source than Russian Wikipedia: https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2017-12-12/nato-expansion-what-gorbachev-heard-western-leaders-early https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2017...

Someone 6y ago

https://www.spiegel.de/international/world/nato-s-eastward-expansion-did-the-west-break-its-promise-to-moscow-a-663315.html https://www.spiegel.de/international/world/nato-s-eastward-e...: After speaking with many of those involved and examining previously classified British and German documents in detail, SPIEGEL has concluded that there was no doubt that the West did everything it could to give the Soviets the impression that NATO membership was out of the question for countries like Poland, Hungary or Czechoslovakia. On Feb. 10, 1990, between 4 and 6:30 p.m., Genscher spoke with Shevardnadze. According to the German record of the conversation, which was only recently declassified, Genscher said: "We are aware that NATO membership for a unified Germany raises complicated questions. For us, however, one thing is certain: NATO will not expand to the east." And because the conversion revolved mainly around East Germany, Genscher added explicitly: "As far as the non-expansion of NATO is concerned, this also applies in general." Shevardnadze replied that he believed "everything the minister (Genscher) said." Edit: https://books.openedition.org/ceup/2759?lang=en https://books.openedition.org/ceup/2759?lang=en says: In the session with Baker on February 9, 1990, Gorbachev discussed various forms of German unification and association with NATO. Although he could not accept it publicly, he agreed with Baker’s argument that the presence of U.S. troops in Europe was a factor in overall European stability, which implicitly meant accepting the idea of Germany’s eventual membership in the Western alliance. It was during this conversation that Baker offered Gorbachev guarantees (that is the word used in the Russian memorandum of conversation—garantii) that NATO would not “spread an inch eastward,” and the Soviet leader accepted the statement as sufficient on the basis of the trust he felt had been built between him and the U.S. leadership—never asking for a written pledge. Gorbachev’s reasoning could partially be explained by the domestic dilemma he faced: how could he tell the Politburo that he had asked for written guarantees that NATO would not expand to the territories of the Warsaw Pact while the Pact was still in existence? That would have meant he had already accepted the idea that the socialist alliance was on its deathbed. In this conversation, Baker was not trying to mislead Gorbachev in any way; he was merely expressing the official position of the U.S. government at the time, which was fully shared by other Western leaders, talking specifically about the NATO presence on East German soil, but by implication also about any future expansion. However, the Bush administration would change that position very soon—without providing any notification to Gorbachev.

older 6y ago
So, basically, someone said something in discussions but no documents were signed?
- ClumsyPilot 6y ago
  Do you think every sensitive political matter is documented and triple - stamped?
- MichaelMoser123 6y ago
  I was wondering about that; if Nato not exanding to the east was imortant, then why didn't the Soviet Union insist to put it into an agreement? I guess it's not quite possible to put such a future commitment of not expanding Nato into writing; as there is no legal mechanism to enforce it.
  - Someone 6y ago
    As the quote I pasted says: “Gorbachev’s reasoning could partially be explained by the domestic dilemma he faced: how could he tell the Politburo that he had asked for written guarantees that NATO would not expand to the territories of the Warsaw Pact while the Pact was still in existence? That would have meant he had already accepted the idea that the socialist alliance was on its deathbed” A good diplomat might have phrased that differently, without removing too much content, though, so that the Warschau pact wouldn’t lose face from it. Maybe something along the lines of that the two parties recognized each other’s spheres of influence? (Or maybe that wasn’t something either party was willing to commit to?)
    - MichaelMoser123 6y ago
      don't know about that argument, they could have insisted to put that commitment into some kind of secret amendment, but wikipedia says that these are no longer practiced; well, who knows, wikipedia also says that there are exceptions to this rule. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secret_treaty#Decline_in_modern_times https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secret_treaty#Decline_in_moder...

AlexCoventry 6y ago

This is the citation in The Folly and the Glory: > Mary Elise Sarotte, “Not One Inch Eastward? Bush, Baker, Kohl, Genscher, Gorbachev, and the Origin of Russian Resentment Toward NATO Enlargement in February 1990,” Diplomatic History 34, no. 1 (January 2010): 119–40. Sarotte fought for, and won, the declassification of key documents cited in this chapter, and she is the leading scholar on the question of NATO expansion. Key conversations between the Bush administration and Gorbachev are in a 2017 National Security Archive briefing book, “NATO Expansion: What Gorbachev Heard,” https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//dc.html?doc=4325680-Document-06-Record-of-conversation-between https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//dc.html?doc=4325680-Document-06-....