3 ms·
Interesting idea that is sure to gain more traction, perhaps better implemented on ETH where they have more control. This implementation seems fatally flawed:
by redm 6y ago
Interesting idea that is sure to gain more traction, perhaps better implemented on ETH where they have more control. This implementation seems fatally flawed:
“This means for $1 about 2,500 disruption transactions can be placed in the wallet. In the case of the current IP address, the Satoshi values that must be sent to the wallet by the operators to recover control total 43,262 Satoshis, or about $16.50. The quick math at current market prices for BTC suggests that for every $1 spent on disruption, the operators will need to spend over $41,000 ($16.50*2,500) to recover their operations and get the orphaned infected systems back to their (current) IP address.”
- qqii 6y agoCouldn't they just query outgoing transactions from the wallet? The estimates given also do not factor transaction fees (currently 0.00041 BTC ~= 25 USD) , the estimated costs are only in value given to the attacker. For this specific botnet continuous denial of service also doesn't make sense. The attacker could easily setup an upgrade at an ip that chooses a different public address.
- amouat 6y agoI don't think they owned the wallet, so they couldn't make outgoing transactions. I assume they didn't want to use a wallet they did control in case it could be used to identify them.
- qqii 6y agoIt just seems like a very thin layer of plausible deniability, in the current setup they control wallets that send the transactions that also can be linked back to them.
- throwawayffffas 6y agoAgreed, I think they didn't really put much thought into it. Their next version will look at only outgoing transactions. They could also use another coin for lower transaction fees.