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>I think this will come down to the makeup of the user base. If say only 10% of your customers are using it for illicit purposes, you can claim you didn't know,
by Aerroon 6y ago
>I think this will come down to the makeup of the user base. If say only 10% of your customers are using it for illicit purposes, you can claim you didn't know, of couldn't have know because the messages are E2E encrypted, however if that number is 50+%, then I think the case could be made that yes even though you couldn't read the exact messages, you can still be held liable.
But what are you supposed to do in this situation? You get an inkling that the service you're providing is used by drug traffickers. If you start taking actions against that then it means you know, therefore more likely to be guilty in the eyes of the law. If you tell law enforcement then you're also taking a risk, because it's still happening in your backyard. On top of that, anything you do has a good chance of destroying the business as well.
- salawat 6y agoYou let law enforcement do their job, and forward what little you can. If you implemented e-2-e encryption properly it isn't your problem you have no access to anything but metadata. If you didn't, and you really have access to keys that enable law enforcement to intercept or crack the encryption, then you weren't really end-to-end encrypted were you? Law enforcement interaction, and adherence to the law is not that much different than following and implementing a protocol. They can ask. You are expected to make a best effort attempt at accomodating what they ask for, given they have probable cost and a warrant. If they say that isn't good enough, you fight it in Court until either a judge modifies the protocol, or stipulates it's a legislative question. Queue lobbying. At all times, law enforcement are bound by probable cause. If they have it, you have to assist to the best of your ability, which for an e-2-e encrypted data stream is pretty much just metadata submission, or production of ciphertext if you're really going full centralized comm-stream tapping CALEA. Design your comm system like WebRTC, where your infra is only there to help two endpoints meet, and you have not even that. That's all there is to it really. Awful people doing awful things is a certainty. LE just have their knickers getting in a twist because their prey are starting to play the game with the blinders of technical ignorance off. What Law Enforcement wants is everyone to agree that they get privileged access to any message propagating through societal infrastructure... I sure hope everyone here understands why it is essential that they don't have it.
- anonymousiam 6y agoGreat idea, until "law enforcement" comes back with a "demand letter". Take a look at how that worked out for LavaBit: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lavabit#Suspension_and_gag_order https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lavabit#Suspension_and_gag_ord...
- salawat 6y agoThe correct response in his case was civil disobedience, cracking open every last detail of what he was being put through, and counting on the rest of us to come to our senses. It's sad, but there really is no other way to reasonably confront tyrannical overreach. If you play by the rules and refuse to be non-compliant, you also sacrifice the one weapon an overreaching Administration has to fear: the Truth. Now in a more naive mindset in my life I'd say go to the press. Nowadays though? It's a hard call who to go to to get the thumbscrews turned on those in power.
- anonymousiam 6y agoNormally I would disagree with you and say that following the law is the best course of action, but the article that Ladar Levison wrote for The Guardian (here: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/may/20/why-did-lavabit-shut-down-snowden-email https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/may/20/why-di...) makes it clear that he should have disobeyed the court summons and allowed himself to be arrested. Had that been the case, he should have been afforded the right to counsel because his liberty was at stake.