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I get the point of it, but I think it's a distraction from the solutions we really need. The whole idea of app firewalls is "do/don't let an arbitrary network c
by 0xbadcafebee 6y ago
I get the point of it, but I think it's a distraction from the solutions we really need. The whole idea of app firewalls is "do/don't let an arbitrary network communication happen unless I know about it". The problem is, what if what you allow still involves an attacker? Say you allow some network connection from application A to site Z using protocols B,C. And say that you even inspect the connection using DLP. There will come a point where the attacker will position themselves to appear exactly like legitimate traffic.
Ultimately, all firewalls are just a very poor hack around a complex problem. The best solution to the problem is to ensure the connection is genuine and that the data being passed is genuine, and you can't do that with an arbitrary monitoring program. You need strong end to end authentication, authorization, and integrity, and sometimes also privacy. But we don't have the tools to do that right now because the protocols were designed for a different time.
Take DLP for example. Almost every major company in the world is starting to implement traffic inspection, because how the hell else are you going to ensure security of your IP with 10,000 employees using TLS 1.3? The inspection you force on the users is its own security hole, to say nothing of software bugs. And you can't even just lock down the network to only protocols that use OAuth or something. None of our security solutions are holistic.
We need a revolution in network security that takes each part of a network communication and its individual security needs into account, not just what we imagine is end-to-end (but never actually is). We can't rely solely on a facile "privacy or nothing" approach to internet security that the TLS mafia has been pushing. We need more flexible methods that allow us to fine-tune security at each level of the protocol stack, across multiple organizations and use cases. Nothing like that exists currently for the web.
- ghostpepper 6y agoWhat would you propose instead?
- 0xbadcafebee 6y agoI'd start by making all network protocols stacked flat with metadata about their being joined together, rather than loosely embedded in one another like matryoshka dolls. This can be done using existing protocols by demarcating each stack layer in an existing stream and adding metadata to link the parts together as they are composed. The end result is that the entire network path is preserved and available for inspection at any point along the network path. By using the metadata, each layer can remain private, but also be directly accessed by any network node that has the proper authorization to view it. This solves service routing issues, middleware issues, application-service integration issues, and end to end security issues. Wrt our current conversation, you could have a network filter which only allows network communications whose packets at a particular layer are authenticated by a particular identity provider, authorized by a particular service provider, encrypted by a particular standard, and pass only a particular set of data using a particular data standard. But looking further, you could have much bigger impacts. For example, right now we have to use NAT for IPv4 because there's no way for a private network to route directly to public networks and vice versa. But with this new scheme, the route tables, host addresses, the DNS, TCP protocol, service address (the address of the service should not require numbering at all, it should just pass a URI and boxes along the way should translate how to route to it based on that local network's definitions), and the various data payloads and formats, all would be delivered to every hop along the way up to the app server. The server reply would be carried back the same way just by reversing the order of the path. And so you could actually route messages between multiple sets of public and private networks, and those networks would allow the traffic or not based on the authn+z protocols and policies at each segment. (Particularly, the application on the user's device would be prompted by the OS whether to accept the packets, similar to how the application firewall works. Except it could actually verify that each data payload was not just signed by a key on a random load balancer, but that it's actually been passed by an application with a valid OAuth session (but not OAuth since much better protocols would be used)) None of this assumes backwards compatibility (again, it's a revolution, not an incremental change). But there are some hacks that could be used to implement some of these features with existing protocols, to make transition easier. However, it's been shown time and again that all we really need to implement breaking changes in internet infrastructure is for a sufficiently large company to force it.
- eeZah7Ux 6y agoSpot on. Firewall are becoming less and less useful in the time of cloud. We need holistic solutions where we can control traffic by entity, domain, role, application, not IP address and port. > There will come a point where the attacker will position themselves to appear exactly like legitimate traffic. It's been happening for decades: botnet C&C servers use HTTPS and run on public clouds, mimicking legitimate websites.