Even if you shouldn't be convinced of a terminal value thing based on evidence, doesn't mean you shouldn't be convinced of an empirical thing that happens to be

Even if you shouldn't be convinced of a terminal value thing based on evidence, doesn't mean you shouldn't be convinced of an empirical thing that happens to be associated with or championed by those who are promoting different values. That's true, and I have been convinced of some of those things. For example, I am empirically convinced that mass shootings by spree killers are shocking but not a major issue of public health or safety in the US. Even though I believe that Democratic politics gives disproportionate attention to mass shootings, weirdly mirroring how Republican politics gives disproportionate attention to Islamist terrorism, I'm not going to say so in the company of many Democrats. Because another thing I have been empirically convinced of is that people build effective political coalitions by emphasizing common ground and judiciously overlooking their allies' faults. I want action on climate issues, so I'm not going to alienate my natural allies by lecturing them about their irrational fear of semi-automatic rifles. Effective politics is almost the thematic opposite of a personal quest to aggressively probe all things in search of Truth. I also don't think cognitive error can be entirely reduced in all cases to revealed preferences, because, uh, -- well, ok, one can, of course, model all behavior as arising from a preference to take exactly the sequence of actions that one takes. But I think you will agree that this is not a reasonable model. It's a model that doesn't lend itself to mathematically grounded predictions. But is it actually not reasonable? Without access to another person's qualia it's really easy to misattribute whether their more surprising decisions are revealing a preference, demonstrating cognitive error, or servicing a fundamentally different value orientation. Like Hume's Problem of Induction I can't effectively grapple with it but I can't exactly dismiss it either.