Even if you shouldn't be convinced of a terminal value thing based on evidence, doesn't mean you shouldn't be convinced of an empirical thing that happens to be

Even if you shouldn't be convinced of a terminal value thing based on evidence, doesn't mean you shouldn't be convinced of an empirical thing that happens to be associated with or championed by those who are promoting different values. So, for example, in the climate change example he gives, while it is of course appropriate to take into account possible biases of people promoting one position or another, and ways that those may result from the different values that the people with those biases, one should nonetheless endeavor to have a tendency to believe what is actually true about the factual matter, even if it were that the people with the wrong values were biased as an (indirect) result of those values, in a way that led them to be more likely to reach the correct conclusion about the empirical facts, than those with the good values. (Not to say that I think this is the case in this example. Just, hypothetically. Or, what do you call something that is like a hypothetical but without expressing any position about whether the thing is actually true?) In addition, while they may get tangled up and which is which may change for a given person over time (due to human thought being fuzzy and wobbly), I think it still makes sense to make a distinction between terminal values and instrumental values. Further, if one values something instrumentally, because one believes that it is instrumentally beneficial for one's terminal values, and it is demonstrably true that it actually does not benefit one's terminal values, then one should come to believe this truth, and so no longer instrumentally value the thing. I also don't think cognitive error can be entirely reduced in all cases to revealed preferences, because, uh, -- well, ok, one can, of course, model all behavior as arising from a preference to take exactly the sequence of actions that one takes. But I think you will agree that this is not a reasonable model. People will sometimes understand their past behavior as arising from a cognitive error, and endeavor to address this. I suppose you could regard this as simply conflicting preferences, or preferences about preferences, but I don't think this is the best way to understand things.