4 ms·
I have some unprofessional sociological suspicions, so I will lay them out as assertions with this caveat serving as the blanket qualifier. First, some observa
by bloaf 6y ago
I have some unprofessional sociological suspicions, so I will lay them out as assertions with this caveat serving as the blanket qualifier.
First, some observations:
1. Research has found that the probability of conspiratorial thinking is quadratic with respect to political extremism in either direction.
2. Dangerous political movements are predicated on an "us v. them" mentality, almost by definition of dangerous. What makes a group dangerous is precisely the fact that they are willing to harm people in concrete ways, and willingness to harm requires a targeted "them".
3. Distributed censorship and other forms of persecution are actually conspiracies with an inherent "us" and "them." The more groups (media companies, government, etc) censor similar ideas in similar ways for similar reasons, the more apt appears the description "they conspired against those ideas."
Therefore: the problem with censorship is that it makes the conspiracy theorists right. Censorship is also an acknowledgement that the censor and censored are in fact different and opposing groups. No longer can the censor say "come on guys, we're all on the same team here," they have ceded that high ground.
Both of these effects can actually help extremist groups attract new people. As they say Plures efficimur, quitiens metimur a vobis: semen est sanguis Christianorum: the blood of the martyrs is the seed of the Church.
HOWEVER
All of this analysis is a kind of "perfect sphere on a friction-less plane" view of the market of ideas. We must not fall into the trap of thinking that if we removed all censorship, the market of ideas would be efficient. If censorship is an effort to artificially devalue some ideas, there is also the countervailing force of amplification which artificially inflates.
The problem is that money has always (and technology has recently) enabled people to distort the market of ideas through amplification. There are actually bad actors (e.g. Russia) who actively amplify ideas beneficial to their interests by putting engineered talking points into fake social media accounts.
I do not believe it is possible to fight such a strategy on the same terms. Amplifying contrary ideas simply increases polarization. Attempting to re-level the playing field via censorship has the problems I listed earlier.
- wnoise 6y ago> 1. Research has found that the probability of conspiratorial thinking is quadratic with respect to political extremism in either direction. Extremism has no natural quantification. This statement is nonsense.
- bloaf 6y agoYou can take that up with the authors: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/271714033_Political_Extremism_Predicts_Belief_in_Conspiracy_Theories https://www.researchgate.net/publication/271714033_Political...
- fhood 6y agoI don't what the research is in question, but I absolutely think that political extremism, particularly in the context of two party systems, can quantified in at least a semi-meaningful way. Create a list of policies. Poll a large equally split group of registered voters from either party. Assign each policy an extremism index based on some combination of the amount of cross party support, and the percentage of total support for each. Now you can use that list to make a reasonable assessment of political extremism based on which of the policies an individual supports.
- wnoise 6y agoYou might be able to order it, sure. Translating that into magnitudes is entirely subjective.
- fhood 6y agoWhy wouldn't the magnitude be a direct consequence of the two factors I already mentioned? Crossparty support and percentage of total?
- wnoise 6y agoWhy would it? It does if and only if that's what you reduce extremism down to. There's enough there to assert a quadratic relationship (in a given regime) with _their particular phenomenological measurement_ of extremism. In the physical sciences we can often get away with ignoring the difference between what a measurement procedure outputs, and what it is measuring. But this only because we have high degrees of repeatability, and concordance with other ways of measurement. Neither has been shown to apply here. The reporting of this is made worse by the use of a common term, rather than the diagnostic tool. Yes, there are common meanings of "energy", "momentum", and so forth, but people understand that they mean very specific technical definitions when a physicist uses them.