3 ms·

Well yeah, but the actors that can overcome that barrier are likely the ones you're most worried about in the first place. So maybe it limits number of adverse

Well yeah, but the actors that can overcome that barrier are likely the ones you're most worried about in the first place. So maybe it limits number of adverse actors that can attempt anything, but it doesn't allow you any shortcuts in system design/security. I've always assumed that frequency barrier stuff was more about defense against tactical, air based electronic jamming/countermeasures. ETA: Thinking about it some more, what you describe seems like a slightly different type of security by obscurity. If you're relying on it for security.

sandworm101 6y ago
Obscurity is about hiding amongst the noise. I describe physical network separation, essentially air-gapping. Do we encrypt the signal between a car's brake pedal and the brakes? Why not? It is a very important network that could result in loss of life. We don't encrypt because the network is physically separate from attackers. If they are tapping into your car's internal wiring then they could kill you in any number of easier ways. A rocket tuned to only listen to emitters from specific locations need not encrypt because it is also physically separated from potential attackers. So in high-reliability systems if encryption/authentication only offers protection in hypothetical edge cases where the attackers is co-located with controllers, but presents any additional complications, it won't be employed.
- perl4ever 6y ago
  >We don't encrypt because the network is physically separate from attackers. Given the existence in modern vehicles of: - a shared bus for communication amongst the processing units - autonomous emergency braking being fairly standard and - network connectivity being available in some cases I think your analogy might be outdated.