This is inaccurate. Any encryption that cryptographers will accept will be semantically secure at a minimum (which FHE is). Briefly, to quote Gentry's paper whi

This is inaccurate. Any encryption that cryptographers will accept will be semantically secure at a minimum (which FHE is). Briefly, to quote Gentry's paper which first showed the existence of FHE: this means given a ciphertext c that encrypts either m0 or m1, it is hard for an adversary to decide which, even if it is allowed to choose m0 and m1. This rules out deterministic encryption, which is not sufficient for the reasons you mention (and is why, for example, you shouldn't use textbook RSA). Also it's actually easier to prove that FHE applications are secure than it is to prove a lot of other things. FHE is designed around commonly used hardness assumptions, such as the Learning With Errors problem. As long as you're encrypting your information correctly there's really nothing Intel can do to leak your information short of disproving open conjectures in computer science. At the very least, they probably won't fumble their way into doing so