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Yes, and that's a good thing. Balkanizing ID info between a gazillion government databases as we do in the US just creates inefficiency, and raises the thirst f

Yes, and that's a good thing. Balkanizing ID info between a gazillion government databases as we do in the US just creates inefficiency, and raises the thirst for more intensive surveillance to counter the inefficiency with which the data is used. (Consider the talk after 9/11 on the FBI and CIA not sharing info, and then we get the Patriot Act.)

deleted 6y ago
[deleted]
XorNot 6y ago
That article about effective government policy being a database access policy a month or so ago was particularly illuminating (and made a lot of sense to me). That any given policies effectiveness really depends on whether you can actually construct - functionally - an appropriate database view to implement it's stages.
jariel 6y ago
Maybe the opposite though - having a 'single, semi-competent authority and source of control/failure/security' is probably not a good reality for security and resiliency. Ironically, there's a >50% chance that the solution will entail 1) privately hosted platforms like AWS and 2) privately hosted support services and 3) privately written core modules (McKinsey business strategy, Accenture implemented etc.) and 4) at least some privately contracted IT people to manage the solution. There's no reason to believe the gov. will make a more robust, scalable and secure solution that other entities. A better approach might even be to mandate very specific identity protocols, and then allow citizens to chose their own identity provider among those that fit the regulatory requirements and oversight. For example: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swiss_Post https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swiss_Post It's owned by gov. and effectively independent. They could be an identity provider. They are already close to being able to do whatever need be done. Having to create new government bureaucracies to do things is hard.
- Ericson2314 6y ago
  > Ironically, there's a >50% chance that the solution will entail 1) privately hosted platforms like AWS and 2) privately hosted support services and 3) privately written core modules (McKinsey business strategy, Accenture implemented etc.) and 4) at least some privately contracted IT people to manage the solution. That would be in the US, with it's shit managment and governance culture of no expertise being required. The Wwiss are explicitly rejecting such willy-nilly privatization; did you read the article? > There's no reason to believe the gov. will make a more robust, scalable and secure solution that other entities. Again this is US ideology about US government. In another places they have something closer to actual democracy, a robust civil service, and an awareness that some things are too important to risk the profit motive sliding to rent-seeking. > A better approach might even be... I actually agree with you here. The next step after centrally planning how electronic identity should work is to realize many things don't need to require an "official one true personhood" surrogate key, and can make due with something weaker and more friendly to anonymity. The same functioning society that can figure out devolved cantons and federated cooperatives would be excellently prepared to figure that out.
AnthonyMouse 6y ago
> Balkanizing ID info between a gazillion government databases as we do in the US just creates inefficiency It improves security through the reduction in the scope of harm and eliminating single points of failure. If someone compromises your Candy Crush login they can't drain your bank account. > and raises the thirst for more intensive surveillance to counter the inefficiency with which the data is used. (Consider the talk after 9/11 on the FBI and CIA not sharing info, and then we get the Patriot Act.) Your argument in favor of centralized ID is that otherwise nefarious spies will lobby in favor of something equivalent to centralized ID so they can correlate everything? That's the argument against it.
- Ericson2314 6y ago
  > It improves security through the reduction in the scope of harm and eliminating single points of failure. If someone compromises your Candy Crush login they can't drain your bank account. "Security through ad-hoc redundancy" is going to replace one possible-good auth systems with a gazillion shity ones that no one has the budget or interest to secure. It's a greater attack service. > It improves security through the reduction in the scope of harm and eliminating single points of failure. If someone compromises your Candy Crush login they can't drain your bank account. No, by all accounts FBI and CIA still hate each other and keep secrets. What we got is more surveillance (NSA dragnets), not more efficient use of the data they already have.
  - AnthonyMouse 6y ago
    > What we got is more surveillance (NSA dragnets), not more efficient use of the data they already have. Or we could just not do that anymore and still not have centralized authentication. > "Security through ad-hoc redundancy" is going to replace one possible-good auth systems with a gazillion shity ones that no one has the budget or interest to secure. It's a greater attack service. You mean attack surface. But that's the trade off. Because none of them are actually secure. Even when you have a full time security team, there are still vulnerabilities. Before the attacker had to find a vulnerability at the DMV, then start over at the bank, then start over at every company's file server. Now instead the attacker only has to find one in the central authentication system and they get everything at once. Even if there aren't as many vulnerabilities, if there is even one, you're screwed beyond comprehension across all systems everywhere. On top of that, widespread use cuts the other way. Suppose the system was originally deployed using sha1. That starts looking pretty weak so you begin the decade-long process of transitioning literally everyone to a system using something else. Then suddenly sha1 gets completely broken beyond all hope, but you can't stop using it because 15% of people haven't migrated away yet and that's too much of the world to abruptly cut off. Whereas in the decentralized system only 15% of things would be vulnerable because the other 85% had already migrated and disabled sha1, and the important stuff like banks who have their own security teams would be in the 85%. More to the point, there are other ways to reduce vulnerabilities without centralization. Use simpler, more stable software from vendors who spend more time on security and less time on feature bloat. Restrict local services to local users so they're not exposed to the internet. Use defense in depth so that a single vulnerability is not enough but the expense of finding five stackable vulnerabilities is uneconomically large relative to the value of compromising an individual system. Whereas the only way to avoid the ominously large scope of compromise of centralized authentication is to decentralize it.

deleted 6y ago

[deleted]

XorNot 6y ago

That article about effective government policy being a database access policy a month or so ago was particularly illuminating (and made a lot of sense to me). That any given policies effectiveness really depends on whether you can actually construct - functionally - an appropriate database view to implement it's stages.

jariel 6y ago

Maybe the opposite though - having a 'single, semi-competent authority and source of control/failure/security' is probably not a good reality for security and resiliency. Ironically, there's a >50% chance that the solution will entail 1) privately hosted platforms like AWS and 2) privately hosted support services and 3) privately written core modules (McKinsey business strategy, Accenture implemented etc.) and 4) at least some privately contracted IT people to manage the solution. There's no reason to believe the gov. will make a more robust, scalable and secure solution that other entities. A better approach might even be to mandate very specific identity protocols, and then allow citizens to chose their own identity provider among those that fit the regulatory requirements and oversight. For example: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swiss_Post https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swiss_Post It's owned by gov. and effectively independent. They could be an identity provider. They are already close to being able to do whatever need be done. Having to create new government bureaucracies to do things is hard.

Ericson2314 6y ago
> Ironically, there's a >50% chance that the solution will entail 1) privately hosted platforms like AWS and 2) privately hosted support services and 3) privately written core modules (McKinsey business strategy, Accenture implemented etc.) and 4) at least some privately contracted IT people to manage the solution. That would be in the US, with it's shit managment and governance culture of no expertise being required. The Wwiss are explicitly rejecting such willy-nilly privatization; did you read the article? > There's no reason to believe the gov. will make a more robust, scalable and secure solution that other entities. Again this is US ideology about US government. In another places they have something closer to actual democracy, a robust civil service, and an awareness that some things are too important to risk the profit motive sliding to rent-seeking. > A better approach might even be... I actually agree with you here. The next step after centrally planning how electronic identity should work is to realize many things don't need to require an "official one true personhood" surrogate key, and can make due with something weaker and more friendly to anonymity. The same functioning society that can figure out devolved cantons and federated cooperatives would be excellently prepared to figure that out.

AnthonyMouse 6y ago

> Balkanizing ID info between a gazillion government databases as we do in the US just creates inefficiency It improves security through the reduction in the scope of harm and eliminating single points of failure. If someone compromises your Candy Crush login they can't drain your bank account. > and raises the thirst for more intensive surveillance to counter the inefficiency with which the data is used. (Consider the talk after 9/11 on the FBI and CIA not sharing info, and then we get the Patriot Act.) Your argument in favor of centralized ID is that otherwise nefarious spies will lobby in favor of something equivalent to centralized ID so they can correlate everything? That's the argument against it.

Ericson2314 6y ago
> It improves security through the reduction in the scope of harm and eliminating single points of failure. If someone compromises your Candy Crush login they can't drain your bank account. "Security through ad-hoc redundancy" is going to replace one possible-good auth systems with a gazillion shity ones that no one has the budget or interest to secure. It's a greater attack service. > It improves security through the reduction in the scope of harm and eliminating single points of failure. If someone compromises your Candy Crush login they can't drain your bank account. No, by all accounts FBI and CIA still hate each other and keep secrets. What we got is more surveillance (NSA dragnets), not more efficient use of the data they already have.
- AnthonyMouse 6y ago
  > What we got is more surveillance (NSA dragnets), not more efficient use of the data they already have. Or we could just not do that anymore and still not have centralized authentication. > "Security through ad-hoc redundancy" is going to replace one possible-good auth systems with a gazillion shity ones that no one has the budget or interest to secure. It's a greater attack service. You mean attack surface. But that's the trade off. Because none of them are actually secure. Even when you have a full time security team, there are still vulnerabilities. Before the attacker had to find a vulnerability at the DMV, then start over at the bank, then start over at every company's file server. Now instead the attacker only has to find one in the central authentication system and they get everything at once. Even if there aren't as many vulnerabilities, if there is even one, you're screwed beyond comprehension across all systems everywhere. On top of that, widespread use cuts the other way. Suppose the system was originally deployed using sha1. That starts looking pretty weak so you begin the decade-long process of transitioning literally everyone to a system using something else. Then suddenly sha1 gets completely broken beyond all hope, but you can't stop using it because 15% of people haven't migrated away yet and that's too much of the world to abruptly cut off. Whereas in the decentralized system only 15% of things would be vulnerable because the other 85% had already migrated and disabled sha1, and the important stuff like banks who have their own security teams would be in the 85%. More to the point, there are other ways to reduce vulnerabilities without centralization. Use simpler, more stable software from vendors who spend more time on security and less time on feature bloat. Restrict local services to local users so they're not exposed to the internet. Use defense in depth so that a single vulnerability is not enough but the expense of finding five stackable vulnerabilities is uneconomically large relative to the value of compromising an individual system. Whereas the only way to avoid the ominously large scope of compromise of centralized authentication is to decentralize it.