> EUT is claiming there are parallel universes Nope. Unless you claim that all discussion of probability does the same. If an agent satisfies the vNM axioms ,

> EUT is claiming there are parallel universes Nope. Unless you claim that all discussion of probability does the same. If an agent satisfies the vNM axioms , that is sufficient to conclude that the agent’s actions are equivalent to maximizing the expectation of some function, which we call the utility. These axioms do not require any assumptions about “parallel universes” beyond simply the concept that “there is such a thing as probability”. Presumably, the same idea would work even if the “probabilities” in question were all from logical uncertainty due to limited computation time, taking place in an entirely deterministic universe. In such a case, there explicitly cannot be the “alternate universes”, because they would be logically inconsistent, but due to computational limits, the agent is still uncertain, and so it still makes sense to deal with expected utility.