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I'm off the opinion that transporting is pointless from a selfish point of view: your duplicate will get to Jupiter or wherever, and think they're you, but your

I'm off the opinion that transporting is pointless from a selfish point of view: your duplicate will get to Jupiter or wherever, and think they're you, but your consciousness will stop so you will never get to experience it. I don't know what experiment you could do to prove this either way.

Engineering-MD 6y ago
You can also apply the same argument Pre and post deep sleep or anaesthetic
- mozey 6y ago
  Oh wow, never thought of that before. Now I'm feeling a little creeped out. Kind of makes me think of the difference between disk and RAM when rebooting a computer
  - fishtacos 6y ago
    There is a sci-fi/horror game called SOMA that explores a related theme. It has an "easy" mode that makes it almost a walking simulator, so even if one is not a gamer, they'd probably enjoy it. Highly recommended. https://somagame.com/ https://somagame.com/
- layer8 6y ago
  ...or even from one moment to the next.
TaupeRanger 6y ago
Assuming there is nothing like a "soul" which persists only in relation to the current cells in your brain, you aren't even the same person you were 2 seconds ago. It's literally no different for the transporter. The "you" of 2 seconds ago is no longer conscious either. Since consciousness is so mysterious, I think admitting our ignorance on the issue is probably the most reasonable approach atm.
tsimionescu 6y ago
I think the rational way to look at it is this: your whole purpose is to set conditions for your future self's success. For example, if you agree to be put under anaesthesia or an induced coma, you are agreeing to die so that your future self will live. When you step into the teleporter, there will actually be two future selves created: one will stay in the teleporter chamber, the other will go to the destination. So to decide if you should do it your not, you need to weigh the benefits to 3 people: (1) your future self if you don't go into the teleporter; (2) your future self who arrives at the destination; (3) your future self who stays back anyway, so who is very similar to (1). If (2) is much happier than (1) and (3) is not significantly less happy than (1), you should rationally do it. If (3) would be significantly less happy, there is also the option of considering having them (painlessly) killed in the process. Either way, the person making the decision will not get to experience either (1), (2), or (3)'s experiences.

Engineering-MD 6y ago

You can also apply the same argument Pre and post deep sleep or anaesthetic

mozey 6y ago
Oh wow, never thought of that before. Now I'm feeling a little creeped out. Kind of makes me think of the difference between disk and RAM when rebooting a computer
- fishtacos 6y ago
  There is a sci-fi/horror game called SOMA that explores a related theme. It has an "easy" mode that makes it almost a walking simulator, so even if one is not a gamer, they'd probably enjoy it. Highly recommended. https://somagame.com/ https://somagame.com/
layer8 6y ago
...or even from one moment to the next.

TaupeRanger 6y ago

Assuming there is nothing like a "soul" which persists only in relation to the current cells in your brain, you aren't even the same person you were 2 seconds ago. It's literally no different for the transporter. The "you" of 2 seconds ago is no longer conscious either. Since consciousness is so mysterious, I think admitting our ignorance on the issue is probably the most reasonable approach atm.

tsimionescu 6y ago

I think the rational way to look at it is this: your whole purpose is to set conditions for your future self's success. For example, if you agree to be put under anaesthesia or an induced coma, you are agreeing to die so that your future self will live. When you step into the teleporter, there will actually be two future selves created: one will stay in the teleporter chamber, the other will go to the destination. So to decide if you should do it your not, you need to weigh the benefits to 3 people: (1) your future self if you don't go into the teleporter; (2) your future self who arrives at the destination; (3) your future self who stays back anyway, so who is very similar to (1). If (2) is much happier than (1) and (3) is not significantly less happy than (1), you should rationally do it. If (3) would be significantly less happy, there is also the option of considering having them (painlessly) killed in the process. Either way, the person making the decision will not get to experience either (1), (2), or (3)'s experiences.