4 ms·

> Therefore, we can represent consciousness as a program that receives some input and performs some compression. Are you of the opinion that gzip is conscious?

> Therefore, we can represent consciousness as a program that receives some input and performs some compression. Are you of the opinion that gzip is conscious? When I execute gzip is it aware that it's compressing things? If so, why do you think that? If not, I don't understand the argument that consciousness and compression are the same thing.

bko 6y ago
It's not my theory, but check out the paper. > Chairs do not carry out compression. They do not source sensory information from multiple locations and process it in parallel. They do not store memories to enhance future compression. And they do not develop a theory of self by compressing their own actions. Therefore they are not conscious > Imagine holding a flame to the leg of a chair. The flame leaves a black mark, therefore the chair has certainly been affected by the flame. But intuitively, it does not seem reasonable to claim that the chair has experienced the flame. This difference between effect and experience is directly related to compression: specifically, the chair fails to experience the flame because the information it provides is not compressed in any way. If a chair’s leg is burned it has no effect on any of the other legs. No information is communicated, and consequently there is no inter-leg data compression to bind the experiences of the chair together. Furthermore, the chair stores no memory (other than a black mark). The burning event has no effect on how subsequent events are processed, meaning that the experiences of the chair are not bound together across time. Finally, because the chair does not compress its own response to the flame, it has no awareness of any subjective experience Similarly, gzip does not develop a theory of self. It just compresses data based on some algorithm. It doesn't learn, have a sense of self or internalize its action https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/297030798.pdf https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/297030798.pdf
- mannykannot 6y ago
  > This difference between effect and experience is directly related to compression: specifically, the chair fails to experience the flame because the information it provides is not compressed in any way. This is just begging the question: this (and everything else quoted in the above post) takes as axiomatic the proposition that consciousness is compression.

bko 6y ago

It's not my theory, but check out the paper. > Chairs do not carry out compression. They do not source sensory information from multiple locations and process it in parallel. They do not store memories to enhance future compression. And they do not develop a theory of self by compressing their own actions. Therefore they are not conscious > Imagine holding a flame to the leg of a chair. The flame leaves a black mark, therefore the chair has certainly been affected by the flame. But intuitively, it does not seem reasonable to claim that the chair has experienced the flame. This difference between effect and experience is directly related to compression: specifically, the chair fails to experience the flame because the information it provides is not compressed in any way. If a chair’s leg is burned it has no effect on any of the other legs. No information is communicated, and consequently there is no inter-leg data compression to bind the experiences of the chair together. Furthermore, the chair stores no memory (other than a black mark). The burning event has no effect on how subsequent events are processed, meaning that the experiences of the chair are not bound together across time. Finally, because the chair does not compress its own response to the flame, it has no awareness of any subjective experience Similarly, gzip does not develop a theory of self. It just compresses data based on some algorithm. It doesn't learn, have a sense of self or internalize its action https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/297030798.pdf https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/297030798.pdf

mannykannot 6y ago
> This difference between effect and experience is directly related to compression: specifically, the chair fails to experience the flame because the information it provides is not compressed in any way. This is just begging the question: this (and everything else quoted in the above post) takes as axiomatic the proposition that consciousness is compression.