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People like Descartes, Helmholtz, Ryle, Dennett, Searle were/are stuck in the framework that tries to explain (while it provides no explanation at all) consciou

People like Descartes, Helmholtz, Ryle, Dennett, Searle were/are stuck in the framework that tries to explain (while it provides no explanation at all) consciousness as an emergent property of a complex enough computation (by neurons). So Dennett, Hofstadter, Edelman et al, while really smart, will never get an inch closer to a true explanation. The mechanism by which general anesthetics temporarily and partially/fully disables consciousness should provide a nice hint in which direction a true explanation should go. There is no doubt imo that the theory will be based on quantum mechanics. Roger Penrose goes even a step further and states that the theory needs a non-computational component. (see Orch Or : https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Orchestrated_objective_reduction https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Orchestrated_objective_reducti... ) In any case, I'm still waiting on an Einsteinian admission from most scientists that it is "their biggest mistake" to consider that a "warm, wet and noisy" environment like the brain cannot host the necessary quantum phenomena. In the current state of affairs, they have been proven wrong already.

omginternets 6y ago
>There is no doubt imo that the theory will be based on quantum mechanics. Eesh, this again ... There has never been a proposed (serious, testable, much less supported) mechanism by which quantum mechanics could explain consciousness. This argument always boils down to "phenomenology happens in the mysterious place". Quantum mechanics is the 21st century pituitary gland. >In any case, I'm still waiting on an Einsteinian admission from most scientists that it is "their biggest mistake" to consider that a "warm, wet and noisy" environment like the brain cannot host the necessary quantum phenomena. In the current state of affairs, they have been proven wrong already. We are all convinced that quantum-mechanical phenomena can take place in microtubules. That debate is settled, but here's the thing: that was never really the issue. The issue was -- again -- that none of these theories explain how phenomenology emerges from quantum mechanics. All they say is "it does". EDIT: >People like Descartes, Helmholtz, Ryle, Dennett, Searle were/are stuck in the framework that tries to explain (while it provides no explanation at all) consciousness as an emergent property of a complex enough computation (by neurons). This, however, is a statement on which we agree. This is why most consciousness researchers set their sites lower: they aim to explain access consciousness, and take no position on phenomenology. In other words, we're displaying humility by asserting knowledge of the easy problem, not the hard one.
- pieter_mj 6y ago
  >Eesh, this again ... Yes, the HN crowd surely loves to downvote these type of posts. You're the compassionate scientist who has seen this layman's argument too many times. The brain is mysterious, consciousness is mysterious, QM is mysterious, bingo, QM will explain consciousness. Well, that's not what I, as a layman, meant. What I meant was Orch-OR and it is at least a good starting point. >That debate is settled, but here's the thing: that was never really the issue. It's still an issue but not in the way you see it. Behavior of microtubules is subject to phenomena like quantum coherence. Microtubules help move mitochondria in the axons. Mitochondria in the axons help suppress or enhance neurotransmitter release. So qm phenomena have a direct effect on the formation of thought. Please let me know If i'm talking nonsense :). >In other words, we're displaying humility by asserting knowledge of the easy problem, not the hard one. You've given up already. I believe we can find a plausible explanation for consciousness. The mainstream theory is an absolute non-explanation, and a dead-end.
  - omginternets 6y ago
    >Well, that's not what I, as a layman, meant. What I meant was Orch-OR and it is at least a good starting point. Very well, I shall look again, but color me (extremely) skeptical. Are you able to propose a mechanism by which quantum mechanics can explain qualia? I have yet to see even a partial mechanism. The issue is that qualia specifically involves something non-mechanistic. You would have to first qualify what the substance of qualia is (it's ontology ... and good luck with that!), how it emerges from quantum-mechanical phenomena, and whence it comes (where is the stuff of qualia when it's not manifesting?). Again, I don't (yet?) see how any mechanistic explanation can explain this. >Please let me know If i'm talking nonsense :). It's not nonsense per se, but none of it addresses the key criticism. You must explain how that causal chain (microtubules -> mitochondria -> neurotransmitter) produces qualia. Your argument is effectively that microtubules can influence the creation of thought. Great! So can neurons! So can drugs! So can a blow to the head! Why insist on microtubules?? Why not elsewhere? >You've given up already. I've also given up on proving the existence of God! Less facetiously: phenomenology has the advantage of being self-evident. We're all pretty much convinced that it exists, contrary to God. Given that, and given the advances in materialist philosophy, it's not prima facie crazy to suspect that phenomenology is a physical process, and therefore amenable to scientific explanation. In this, you have a point. However, I don't think science (or philosophy for that matter) currently has the ability to propose an explanation for how some process p implements qualia. We don't even know what such a theory would look like. As such, the quantum-mechanical argument really does seem like the pituitary gland of the 21st century. >The mainstream theory is an absolute non-explanation Which mainstream theory? Are you referring to access consciousness? If so, then you are basing your argument on a false premnise, namely that these scientists are investigating the same thing as you. They are not. They are interested in another thing we call consciousness, which may or may not be related to the phenomenological consciousness that you are interested in. It's still an interesting question. If you're referring to mainstream theory of phenomenology (e.g. sensorimotor theory), it is at the very least no more absurd than quantum-mechanical theories. >Yes, the HN crowd surely loves to downvote these type of posts. Respectfully, have you considered the possibility that your ideas just don't add up? I mean no disrespect, and again will take another look (links welcome), but I notice that you have not addressed the central question of how a mechanism (let alone yours, specifically) can produce a qualia. I suspect this is what motivates the downvotes.
GoblinSlayer 6y ago
Anesthetics make that emergent behavior to cease or something to that effect. The hard problem is applicable to computers too, but they don't rely on any quantum phenomena, which is enough to show, that quantum phenomena are irrelevant and are more likely to be a hindrance, if they were, they would introduce randomness, which leads to hard indeterminism.
- pieter_mj 6y ago
  >they would introduce randomness Not good enough for free will, which needs true unknownability, like in, we don't know whether Schrödinger's cat is dead or alive, until we look.
  - omginternets 6y ago
    You already get that unknowability at the intramolecular level, i.e. pharmacological agents binding to receptors. Your theory adds zero explanatory power.

omginternets 6y ago

>There is no doubt imo that the theory will be based on quantum mechanics. Eesh, this again ... There has never been a proposed (serious, testable, much less supported) mechanism by which quantum mechanics could explain consciousness. This argument always boils down to "phenomenology happens in the mysterious place". Quantum mechanics is the 21st century pituitary gland. >In any case, I'm still waiting on an Einsteinian admission from most scientists that it is "their biggest mistake" to consider that a "warm, wet and noisy" environment like the brain cannot host the necessary quantum phenomena. In the current state of affairs, they have been proven wrong already. We are all convinced that quantum-mechanical phenomena can take place in microtubules. That debate is settled, but here's the thing: that was never really the issue. The issue was -- again -- that none of these theories explain how phenomenology emerges from quantum mechanics. All they say is "it does". EDIT: >People like Descartes, Helmholtz, Ryle, Dennett, Searle were/are stuck in the framework that tries to explain (while it provides no explanation at all) consciousness as an emergent property of a complex enough computation (by neurons). This, however, is a statement on which we agree. This is why most consciousness researchers set their sites lower: they aim to explain access consciousness, and take no position on phenomenology. In other words, we're displaying humility by asserting knowledge of the easy problem, not the hard one.

pieter_mj 6y ago
>Eesh, this again ... Yes, the HN crowd surely loves to downvote these type of posts. You're the compassionate scientist who has seen this layman's argument too many times. The brain is mysterious, consciousness is mysterious, QM is mysterious, bingo, QM will explain consciousness. Well, that's not what I, as a layman, meant. What I meant was Orch-OR and it is at least a good starting point. >That debate is settled, but here's the thing: that was never really the issue. It's still an issue but not in the way you see it. Behavior of microtubules is subject to phenomena like quantum coherence. Microtubules help move mitochondria in the axons. Mitochondria in the axons help suppress or enhance neurotransmitter release. So qm phenomena have a direct effect on the formation of thought. Please let me know If i'm talking nonsense :). >In other words, we're displaying humility by asserting knowledge of the easy problem, not the hard one. You've given up already. I believe we can find a plausible explanation for consciousness. The mainstream theory is an absolute non-explanation, and a dead-end.
- omginternets 6y ago
  >Well, that's not what I, as a layman, meant. What I meant was Orch-OR and it is at least a good starting point. Very well, I shall look again, but color me (extremely) skeptical. Are you able to propose a mechanism by which quantum mechanics can explain qualia? I have yet to see even a partial mechanism. The issue is that qualia specifically involves something non-mechanistic. You would have to first qualify what the substance of qualia is (it's ontology ... and good luck with that!), how it emerges from quantum-mechanical phenomena, and whence it comes (where is the stuff of qualia when it's not manifesting?). Again, I don't (yet?) see how any mechanistic explanation can explain this. >Please let me know If i'm talking nonsense :). It's not nonsense per se, but none of it addresses the key criticism. You must explain how that causal chain (microtubules -> mitochondria -> neurotransmitter) produces qualia. Your argument is effectively that microtubules can influence the creation of thought. Great! So can neurons! So can drugs! So can a blow to the head! Why insist on microtubules?? Why not elsewhere? >You've given up already. I've also given up on proving the existence of God! Less facetiously: phenomenology has the advantage of being self-evident. We're all pretty much convinced that it exists, contrary to God. Given that, and given the advances in materialist philosophy, it's not prima facie crazy to suspect that phenomenology is a physical process, and therefore amenable to scientific explanation. In this, you have a point. However, I don't think science (or philosophy for that matter) currently has the ability to propose an explanation for how some process p implements qualia. We don't even know what such a theory would look like. As such, the quantum-mechanical argument really does seem like the pituitary gland of the 21st century. >The mainstream theory is an absolute non-explanation Which mainstream theory? Are you referring to access consciousness? If so, then you are basing your argument on a false premnise, namely that these scientists are investigating the same thing as you. They are not. They are interested in another thing we call consciousness, which may or may not be related to the phenomenological consciousness that you are interested in. It's still an interesting question. If you're referring to mainstream theory of phenomenology (e.g. sensorimotor theory), it is at the very least no more absurd than quantum-mechanical theories. >Yes, the HN crowd surely loves to downvote these type of posts. Respectfully, have you considered the possibility that your ideas just don't add up? I mean no disrespect, and again will take another look (links welcome), but I notice that you have not addressed the central question of how a mechanism (let alone yours, specifically) can produce a qualia. I suspect this is what motivates the downvotes.

GoblinSlayer 6y ago

Anesthetics make that emergent behavior to cease or something to that effect. The hard problem is applicable to computers too, but they don't rely on any quantum phenomena, which is enough to show, that quantum phenomena are irrelevant and are more likely to be a hindrance, if they were, they would introduce randomness, which leads to hard indeterminism.

pieter_mj 6y ago
>they would introduce randomness Not good enough for free will, which needs true unknownability, like in, we don't know whether Schrödinger's cat is dead or alive, until we look.
- omginternets 6y ago
  You already get that unknowability at the intramolecular level, i.e. pharmacological agents binding to receptors. Your theory adds zero explanatory power.