3 ms·
If you use a modern protocol, doing (2) doesn't make any difference for this purpose on its own. The server's long term private key for say, TLS 1.3 (and the p
by tialaramex 6y ago
If you use a modern protocol, doing (2) doesn't make any difference for this purpose on its own.
The server's long term private key for say, TLS 1.3 (and the popular modes of TLS 1.2 but we'll sidestep discussing that) doesn't help you decrypt the messages. Its purpose is only to produce proof (by signing the transcript) that you're really you.
There are two plausible choices you could make to achieve the goal you've described other than your suggestion (1)
The first option is you send the ephemeral session secrets, if the hypothetical Bad Guys you want to help are only interested in retrospectively decrypting transmissions you could even batch these secrets up and send them over periodically, one flash drive full of secrets at a time for example.
The other alternative is that you choose one (or a few) value for your supposedly ephemeral random choice in ECDH and communicate this value to the Bad Guys. This is of course detectable by your peers, some systems may in fact detect this already. By knowing what your choice will be in ECDH they can figure out the agreed session secrets each time.
Unlike your option (2) this is not very subtle. Why are flash drives full of secret data sent to the KGB every morning? Or why does your "secure" server always pick 7 as its random number?