It could probably be rationally argued that cartel behavior is as destructive as (or more destructive than) monopoly behavior in a capitalistic economic system.

It could probably be rationally argued that cartel behavior is as destructive as (or more destructive than) monopoly behavior in a capitalistic economic system. In a monopolistic situation there's almost always incentive for those "outside" the monopoly to weaken or disband the monopoly's stronghold; if enough individuals join together and engage in cartel behavior independently from the monopoly, the market at least turns into a duopoly. However, in a cartel situation where there's no threat of duopoly or oligopoly, there's more incentive to join the cartel than there is to attempt to disband the central monopoly that's essentially controlling the cartel. It's almost like high-level blackmail because it makes the monopoly stronger while weakening the incentive to compete "outside" the monopoly. For example -- my favorite soapbox issue: the National Association of Realtors. They could be likened to a cartel of people unified in their incentive to keep their "spread" around 6.x percent. These IPO financiers are likely in the same boat: they all know and silently agree that they're better of keeping their spread at 6.x or 7.x percent than they would be going off on their own or using their "little" money to compete with the "big" money of IPOs.