Two objects of the same logical form are—apart from their ex- ternal properties—only differentiated from one another in that they are different. differentiated

Two objects of the same logical form are—apart from their ex- ternal properties—only differentiated from one another in that they are different. differentiated in that they are different. It is a mediocre circular reasoning. The correct statement could have been to say that they are internally structurally the same object but have different identity like e.g in nominal typing. HOWEVER, I skimmed the tractacus years ago and now I update my jugement: The tractacus has many flaws but it is not pure bullshit nor a bullshit detector test despite the striking irony of Wittgenstein saying in the preface and in the conclusion Its whole meaning could be summed up somewhat as follows: What can be said at all can be said clearly; and whereof one cannot speak thereof one must be silent. And then spending a hundred a pages talking in a non clear, vague manner about a few conclusions that are one 1) obvious to any rationalist And 2) that can be summed up in ~one page Cf the symbol grounding problem, defining empiricism and that metaphysical questions are by design out of the scope of science and therefore cannot be answered (well an exhaustive list of the possibles can still be given). This book has a very low signal to noise ratio which make it easy to mistakely take for bullshit/pseudo intellectualism. As a NLU researcher some of his thoughts are actually interesting about how do define a semantic space even if most of them are trivial.