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> has no boot security to detect such Purism's Chief Security Officer Kyle Rankin commented that Purism is "looking into implementing" the Librem Key for tampe
by fsflover 6y ago
> has no boot security to detect such
Purism's Chief Security Officer Kyle Rankin commented that Purism is "looking into implementing" the Librem Key for tamper-evident booting on the Librem 5. Another way this could be done is storing hashes of the boot files in an OpenPGP smartcard to compare with the current boot files to verify that they haven't been changed.
https://source.puri.sm/Librem5/community-wiki/-/wikis/Frequently-Asked-Questions#43-how-secure-is-the-librem-5-compared-to-an-android-phone https://source.puri.sm/Librem5/community-wiki/-/wikis/Freque...
- 177tcca 6y agoPurism can "look into" whatever - they're going to be playing catch up until they have serious security researchers. I used to be enamored by Purism publications until I saw GrapheneOS.org.
- fsflover 6y agoLibrem 5 is the only phone in the world having mobile/desktop convergence and OpenPGP smartcard. This is not just theoretical possibility, a lot of research has already been put into it.