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I have mixed feelings about this. I agree with him that if the SVR specifically targeted a particular organization with a specific goal in mind, it wouldn't rea
by blincoln 6y ago
I have mixed feelings about this. I agree with him that if the SVR specifically targeted a particular organization with a specific goal in mind, it wouldn't really matter if they had weak passwords or not.
OTOH, I think it's not out of the question that one or more organizations (intelligence agencies, criminals, etc.) found the password and took advantage of it more as a "let's see where this thread leads" type of opportunistic attack, and all of the downstream consequences only happened because of that.
I've never worked for an intelligence agency, but I've been a professional penetration tester for about a decade, and when I go after an organization, that's typically my approach: find the weakest links and start following them to see where they go. In a complex environment, usually that leads to control over everything sooner or later.
Edit: just to clarify that last paragraph, what I'm getting at is that if I imagine myself in the shoes of an intelligence agency, the "organizations" I'd be going after would be foreign countries. I'm sure in some cases it would make sense to go after specific businesses of interest, but in the absence of legal restrictions, I'd be looking for the weakest links in entire industries that supported those countries in some way, not necessarily picking a specific business and targeting them.
There are quite a few companies out there that make systems monitoring and administration software that would provide similar levels of access to a wide range of organizations if their build chains were compromised. The one that was compromised was the one that also had a publicly-exposed update server with a password that could have been obtained in at least two different ways.[1] Coincidence? Perhaps, but I don't think it's fair to just take it off the table.
[1] Accidentally exposed in a public GitHub repo for many months, as well as being easily guessed. Either alone would have been enough. Both being true seems to me to make it more likely.
- troydavis 6y agoI think that's a good summary. Also, it's easy to imagine the SVR poking at all companies which sell high-trust applications[1] to many government agencies, and running with the ones[2] that worked. Regarding whether the password thing was a coincidence, I wouldn't be surprised that, if other large enterprise software companies were severely hacked, similar stories surfaced. That doesn't mean it's a coincidence, of course, but may mean that this is average among enterprise software companies. One takeaway here is that software companies shipping trusted software to third-party networks have an exposure more like Google or the Federal Reserve, not like other software companies. That's not how (a lot of) the software industry has acted. [1]: NMS, systems management, facilities management, possibly CRM [2]: Where one was detected (because the attackers chose the wrong target in FireEye), others have probably occurred and/or are active now. While this was very sophisticated, it wasn't Stuxnet (https://blog.erratasec.com/2021/02/no-1000-engineers-were-not-needed-for.html https://blog.erratasec.com/2021/02/no-1000-engineers-were-no...).