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> If you want a secure system, don't run untrusted code as root! This pretty much means: don't run any untrusted code as any user (because privilege escalation
by pilif 6y ago
> If you want a secure system, don't run untrusted code as root!
This pretty much means: don't run any untrusted code as any user (because privilege escalation) and that also pretty much includes visiting any web page.
Security flaws exist and they are in-fact being abused.
Not having to completely wipe a machine (if that even helps. Who knows what kind of tricks malware elevating its privileges to root can pull) after every day of web browsing is a nice convenience to have.
- NullPrefix 6y ago>This pretty much means: don't run any untrusted code as any user Wasn't this a recommendation from Intel when spectre/meltdown happened?
- Nullabillity 6y agoMalware running as root doesn't need kernel access to wreak plenty of havoc. Hell, your own user has access to almost all of the data that both you and the malware author are likely to care about.
- user-the-name 6y agoYes, the security model based around users in Unix is very outdated at this point. It doesn't really represent the kind of threats a modern computer faces.
- gruez 6y agoRelevant xkcd: https://xkcd.com/1200/ https://xkcd.com/1200/
- pilif 6y agoMalware running as a normal user can't put itself in a position where it's hidden from software running as root. Preserving system integrity was my point. The patch in the original article is about preserving system integrity in the face of a compromised root account and the only way of doing that is by limiting the capabilities of the root user. It adds one more and hopefully final level of defense in order to guarantee system integrity.
- yjftsjthsd-h 6y ago> because privilege escalation If we're assuming a vulnerable kernel, why not assume vulnerable firmware and throw the whole thing out?