6 ms·

If his vote is not decisive then yes. But, in theory, a vote of the representative that has low stake can be decisive. The commitment of two conflicting votes

If his vote is not decisive then yes. But, in theory, a vote of the representative that has low stake can be decisive. The commitment of two conflicting votes can split the network, thereby ruining it.

StavrosK 6y ago
Ahh, that's interesting, thank you. It sounds like a low probability scenario, but not impossible.
- dandanua 6y ago
  You can try to raise this probability by DDoSing representatives with high stakes.
a1369209993 6y ago
> The commitment of two conflicting votes can split the network, thereby ruining it. Couldn't this be repaired (with probability something like 1-O(compromised stake) per attempt), by exhibiting (in, say, lexicographic order) the two conflicting blocks (thereby invalidating both), and continuing with the chain? Eg, crude sketch off the top of my head: A -> B1 A -> B2 A -> B2 -> C2 # built off conflicting chain A -> b1 -> b2 -> C3 # resolved chain (block b dead) The resolved chain would have more blocks initially (2 vs 1), and roughly twice the number of nodes supporting it (since the split chains would by construction be valid to only about half the network each. I'm not sure the logistics of this works out, so non-rhetorically: could this work? I'm cribbing some intuitions from proof-of-work designs, but it seems like it ought to be possible in principle.
- dandanua 6y ago
  I'm not fully following your logic, but to resolve that problem you need another consensus algorithm over the votes of representatives. And I don't know how we can effectively use the fact, that a probability of harmful representative behavior is very small.
  - a1369209993 6y ago
    Basically, a representative who splits the network by commiting two conflicting votes is (AIUI) by definition defective, and any representative that observes both potential blocks knows that, and can propagate that knowledge to any representative it communicates with (which must be most of them in order for them know what that (observing) representative's vote was). And once most representatives know that a vote was spoiled, they can throw it out (along with the two blocks it distiguishes between, although I think those still need to stored, just the transactions in them are treated as not having happened). But, as I said, I'm not sure about the logistics/provable-correctness of making sure that the half of the network that voted one way and the half that voted the other way always have a chance to compare notes soon enough to catch a spoiled vote.
charcircuit 6y ago
This is not how Nano works. You need to compromise 51% of the online voting weight. There is also no splits in the network. Once a transaction has been confirmed it is final.

StavrosK 6y ago

Ahh, that's interesting, thank you. It sounds like a low probability scenario, but not impossible.

dandanua 6y ago
You can try to raise this probability by DDoSing representatives with high stakes.

a1369209993 6y ago

> The commitment of two conflicting votes can split the network, thereby ruining it. Couldn't this be repaired (with probability something like 1-O(compromised stake) per attempt), by exhibiting (in, say, lexicographic order) the two conflicting blocks (thereby invalidating both), and continuing with the chain? Eg, crude sketch off the top of my head: A -> B1 A -> B2 A -> B2 -> C2 # built off conflicting chain A -> b1 -> b2 -> C3 # resolved chain (block b dead) The resolved chain would have more blocks initially (2 vs 1), and roughly twice the number of nodes supporting it (since the split chains would by construction be valid to only about half the network each. I'm not sure the logistics of this works out, so non-rhetorically: could this work? I'm cribbing some intuitions from proof-of-work designs, but it seems like it ought to be possible in principle.

dandanua 6y ago
I'm not fully following your logic, but to resolve that problem you need another consensus algorithm over the votes of representatives. And I don't know how we can effectively use the fact, that a probability of harmful representative behavior is very small.
- a1369209993 6y ago
  Basically, a representative who splits the network by commiting two conflicting votes is (AIUI) by definition defective, and any representative that observes both potential blocks knows that, and can propagate that knowledge to any representative it communicates with (which must be most of them in order for them know what that (observing) representative's vote was). And once most representatives know that a vote was spoiled, they can throw it out (along with the two blocks it distiguishes between, although I think those still need to stored, just the transactions in them are treated as not having happened). But, as I said, I'm not sure about the logistics/provable-correctness of making sure that the half of the network that voted one way and the half that voted the other way always have a chance to compare notes soon enough to catch a spoiled vote.

charcircuit 6y ago

This is not how Nano works. You need to compromise 51% of the online voting weight. There is also no splits in the network. Once a transaction has been confirmed it is final.