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This conclusion requires, as an independent postulate, the premise that there cannot be infinite regress, which, if asserted without independent justification,

This conclusion requires, as an independent postulate, the premise that there cannot be infinite regress, which, if asserted without independent justification, amounts to begging the question.

throw0101a 6y ago
> If every constituent member of that order is causally dependent on something prior to itself, then it appears that the order in question must consist of an infinite chain of causes. Yet Aquinas denies this implication (fourth premise): if the causal order is infinite, then (obviously) there could be no first cause. But without a first cause, then (necessarily) there could be no subsequent effects—including the intermediate efficient causes and ultimate effect (ST Ia 2.3). In other words, the absence of a first cause would imply an absence of the causal order we observe. But since this implication is manifestly false, he says, there must be a first cause, “to which everyone gives the name God” (Ibid.). * https://iep.utm.edu/aq-ph-th/#SH2b https://iep.utm.edu/aq-ph-th/#SH2b
- mannykannot 6y ago
  > But without a first cause, then (necessarily) there could be no subsequent effects. This is where there seems to be a somewhat subtle implied premise, as the most one can say about necessity here is that without a first cause, then either there could be no subsequent effects or there is an infinite causal regress. And regardless of that, this argument tells us nothing about what sort of first cause there might be, so when Aquinas says “to which everyone gives the name God”, he's just winging it, in that just about everyone's notion of God has some specific characteristics. The use of "manifestly", and appeals to plausibility, intuition or convention such as "to which everyone..." are something of a tell: when philosophers resort to such language, we know they cannot prove that they have a sound argument. These sort of arguments are quite entertaining to discuss, but Alvin Plantinga, for one, is under no illusion that they actually prove the existence of God.
  - leephillips 6y ago
    We do have uncaused causes, but they are not God. They are fundamental processes such as radioactive decay, which occur in any particular interval of time with a certain probability, but have no cause. Sorry, Aquinas.
    - throw0101a 6y ago
      One response: > In particular, the critic owes us an account of why, since physics cannot in principle capture all there is to physical reality in the first place -- and in particular arguably fails entirely (as Russell held) to capture causality in general -- we should regard it as especially noteworthy if it fails to capture causality in one particular case. If the critic, like the early Russell, denies that there is any causality at all, he owes us an account of how he can coherently take such a position, and in particular how he can account for our knowledge of the world physics tells us about if we have no causal contact with it. If the critic says instead that genuine causality does exist in some parts of nature but not in the particular cases he thinks quantum mechanics casts doubt on, he owes us an account of why we should draw the line where he says we should, and how there could be such a line. […] > In short, anyone who claims that quantum mechanics undermines Scholastic metaphysical claims about causality owes us an alternative worked-out metaphysical picture before we should take him seriously (just as anyone who would claim that quantum mechanics undermines the law of excluded middle owes us an alternative system of logic if we are to take him seriously). And if he gives us one, it would really be that metaphysical system itself, rather than quantum mechanics per se, that is doing the heavy lifting. * https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2014/12/causality-and-radioactive-decay.html https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2014/12/causality-and-radio... (Warning: it's a long read.) Also references a previous post: > Recall that in an earlier post Oerter claimed that quantum mechanics casts doubt on the principle of causality insofar as it describes “systems that change from one state to another without any apparent physical ‘trigger.’” Recall also that I pointed out that it is simply a fallacy to infer from the premise that QM describes such-and-such a state without describing its cause to the conclusion that QM shows that such-and-such a state has no cause. * https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2012/05/oerter-contra-principle-of-causality.html https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2012/05/oerter-contra-princ...

This conclusion requires, as an independent postulate, the premise that there cannot be infinite regress, which, if asserted without independent justification, amounts to begging the question.

throw0101a 6y ago

> If every constituent member of that order is causally dependent on something prior to itself, then it appears that the order in question must consist of an infinite chain of causes. Yet Aquinas denies this implication (fourth premise): if the causal order is infinite, then (obviously) there could be no first cause. But without a first cause, then (necessarily) there could be no subsequent effects—including the intermediate efficient causes and ultimate effect (ST Ia 2.3). In other words, the absence of a first cause would imply an absence of the causal order we observe. But since this implication is manifestly false, he says, there must be a first cause, “to which everyone gives the name God” (Ibid.). * https://iep.utm.edu/aq-ph-th/#SH2b https://iep.utm.edu/aq-ph-th/#SH2b

mannykannot 6y ago
> But without a first cause, then (necessarily) there could be no subsequent effects. This is where there seems to be a somewhat subtle implied premise, as the most one can say about necessity here is that without a first cause, then either there could be no subsequent effects or there is an infinite causal regress. And regardless of that, this argument tells us nothing about what sort of first cause there might be, so when Aquinas says “to which everyone gives the name God”, he's just winging it, in that just about everyone's notion of God has some specific characteristics. The use of "manifestly", and appeals to plausibility, intuition or convention such as "to which everyone..." are something of a tell: when philosophers resort to such language, we know they cannot prove that they have a sound argument. These sort of arguments are quite entertaining to discuss, but Alvin Plantinga, for one, is under no illusion that they actually prove the existence of God.
- leephillips 6y ago
  We do have uncaused causes, but they are not God. They are fundamental processes such as radioactive decay, which occur in any particular interval of time with a certain probability, but have no cause. Sorry, Aquinas.
  - throw0101a 6y ago
    One response: > In particular, the critic owes us an account of why, since physics cannot in principle capture all there is to physical reality in the first place -- and in particular arguably fails entirely (as Russell held) to capture causality in general -- we should regard it as especially noteworthy if it fails to capture causality in one particular case. If the critic, like the early Russell, denies that there is any causality at all, he owes us an account of how he can coherently take such a position, and in particular how he can account for our knowledge of the world physics tells us about if we have no causal contact with it. If the critic says instead that genuine causality does exist in some parts of nature but not in the particular cases he thinks quantum mechanics casts doubt on, he owes us an account of why we should draw the line where he says we should, and how there could be such a line. […] > In short, anyone who claims that quantum mechanics undermines Scholastic metaphysical claims about causality owes us an alternative worked-out metaphysical picture before we should take him seriously (just as anyone who would claim that quantum mechanics undermines the law of excluded middle owes us an alternative system of logic if we are to take him seriously). And if he gives us one, it would really be that metaphysical system itself, rather than quantum mechanics per se, that is doing the heavy lifting. * https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2014/12/causality-and-radioactive-decay.html https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2014/12/causality-and-radio... (Warning: it's a long read.) Also references a previous post: > Recall that in an earlier post Oerter claimed that quantum mechanics casts doubt on the principle of causality insofar as it describes “systems that change from one state to another without any apparent physical ‘trigger.’” Recall also that I pointed out that it is simply a fallacy to infer from the premise that QM describes such-and-such a state without describing its cause to the conclusion that QM shows that such-and-such a state has no cause. * https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2012/05/oerter-contra-principle-of-causality.html https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2012/05/oerter-contra-princ...