3 ms·

First of all, the chance that you are a simulation does not depend on the number of simulations in existence. In fact, there is no such chance, as there is no r

First of all, the chance that you are a simulation does not depend on the number of simulations in existence. In fact, there is no such chance, as there is no random distribution process you are observing, except you claim that every observer has one of finitely many souls somehow assigned to them. Such things belong into the realm of religion. But even then, either you are real or not. If you are not, there is no reason to assume that you exist in reality. And then there is the fundamental laws of nature. If our universe is indeed a simulation, then it is either just an approximation of reality, or reality follows different laws of nature. In that case, again, it makes no sense to think of oneself as a random choice between one reality and many simulations, as oneselve's existence depends on one specific kind of universe.

drdeca 6y ago
A physically random process isn’t needed for probabilities to make sense. Further, suppose a computer agent knew that it would soon have 6 copies of itself (including current state) would be spun up, each in a different vm, and for each vm, a different simulated environment, but that the current copy of itself would also continue running. While each of the simulated environments differ from each-other and the true/outer environment, they don’t differ in a way that can quickly be detected. Different actions in the simulated environments and the “real”/original environment, would have different effects in the original environment, effects which the agent cares about. In order to best produce outcomes in accordance with what the agent cares about, how should the agent act? I think it makes sense for the agent to act as if there is a 1/7 chance that it is in the original environment, and a 6/7 chance it is in one of the 6 simulated environments. How could it be otherwise? Suppose the original, and each of the vm copies, is given a choice between two options, X or Y, where if it chooses X, then if it is the original, then it gets +m utility of benefit in the original environment , but if it is one of the copies in a vm, instead it gets -n utility of benefit in it cares about in the original environment. If it chooses Y, then there is no change in the reward. The combination of values of m and n which combine to result in it making sense for to choose X, are exactly those such that would make it make sense assuming it has a 1/7 chance of being the original and 6/7 chance of being in a vm. That being said, I don’t think we are in a simulation. I just don’t think that the concept of “assigning a probability other than 0,1 or 1/2 to being in a simulation” is always unreasonable in all conceivable circumstances. I just happen to think that it is highly unlikely for us.
- choeger 6y ago
  Your contrived example starts with the very premise of a distribution. An agent gets copied. There are 7 variants. You make an experiment and argue that for 6 of the 7 variants your strategy is successful. All builds on the premise of a distribution, because otherwise the notion of chance has no meaning. Note, that the distribution must not be random, but it must exist. Take the perspective of your agent: There is no way to learn about the number of other agents, and this number is absolutely central to your argument. Every agent will at some point notice that a specific strategy is successful. It will appear like a universal law of nature. For each agent there is no chance involved, it is 100% predetermined what the correct strategy is.
  - drdeca 6y ago
    I was imagining that it was informed of the number of copies that would be made beforehand . Also, that the different copies couldn’t tell by the results of their choices, whether they were in the original environment or not. So, there is some best strategy in each env, but because they can’t tell which env they are in, they can’t actually have different strategies. Saying there is no chance involved is like saying that if John rolls a fair 6 sided die under a cup, and you and Jane don’t know the result, and Jane offers to bet you at some odds that the die is showing the number 4, that there is no probability involved because the value of the die has already been determined. Ok, sure, it is already determined in the world, but one should still assign probability 1/6 the the die shows a 4.

drdeca 6y ago

A physically random process isn’t needed for probabilities to make sense. Further, suppose a computer agent knew that it would soon have 6 copies of itself (including current state) would be spun up, each in a different vm, and for each vm, a different simulated environment, but that the current copy of itself would also continue running. While each of the simulated environments differ from each-other and the true/outer environment, they don’t differ in a way that can quickly be detected. Different actions in the simulated environments and the “real”/original environment, would have different effects in the original environment, effects which the agent cares about. In order to best produce outcomes in accordance with what the agent cares about, how should the agent act? I think it makes sense for the agent to act as if there is a 1/7 chance that it is in the original environment, and a 6/7 chance it is in one of the 6 simulated environments. How could it be otherwise? Suppose the original, and each of the vm copies, is given a choice between two options, X or Y, where if it chooses X, then if it is the original, then it gets +m utility of benefit in the original environment , but if it is one of the copies in a vm, instead it gets -n utility of benefit in it cares about in the original environment. If it chooses Y, then there is no change in the reward. The combination of values of m and n which combine to result in it making sense for to choose X, are exactly those such that would make it make sense assuming it has a 1/7 chance of being the original and 6/7 chance of being in a vm. That being said, I don’t think we are in a simulation. I just don’t think that the concept of “assigning a probability other than 0,1 or 1/2 to being in a simulation” is always unreasonable in all conceivable circumstances. I just happen to think that it is highly unlikely for us.

choeger 6y ago
Your contrived example starts with the very premise of a distribution. An agent gets copied. There are 7 variants. You make an experiment and argue that for 6 of the 7 variants your strategy is successful. All builds on the premise of a distribution, because otherwise the notion of chance has no meaning. Note, that the distribution must not be random, but it must exist. Take the perspective of your agent: There is no way to learn about the number of other agents, and this number is absolutely central to your argument. Every agent will at some point notice that a specific strategy is successful. It will appear like a universal law of nature. For each agent there is no chance involved, it is 100% predetermined what the correct strategy is.
- drdeca 6y ago
  I was imagining that it was informed of the number of copies that would be made beforehand . Also, that the different copies couldn’t tell by the results of their choices, whether they were in the original environment or not. So, there is some best strategy in each env, but because they can’t tell which env they are in, they can’t actually have different strategies. Saying there is no chance involved is like saying that if John rolls a fair 6 sided die under a cup, and you and Jane don’t know the result, and Jane offers to bet you at some odds that the die is showing the number 4, that there is no probability involved because the value of the die has already been determined. Ok, sure, it is already determined in the world, but one should still assign probability 1/6 the the die shows a 4.