Much like other fundamental mistakes in the article it makes one relevant to the nuclear triad you're discussing as well. > 3,800 warheads [..] for practical p

Much like other fundamental mistakes in the article it makes one relevant to the nuclear triad you're discussing as well. > 3,800 warheads [..] for practical purposes, after the first few, they quickly grow redundant. “Once you've dropped a couple of nuclear bombs on a city, if you drop a couple more, all you do is make the rubble shake,” I'm frankly not sure if this is deliberately disingenuous, intended to be hyperbole, or a fundamental lack of understanding of the situation or some combination of all three, but, this is exceptionally wrong. The reason you have 3,800 warheads isn't to aim them all at one city. Remember just as the soviets target our nuclear missile silos we must target theirs. Moreover, having such an extensive fleet of missiles ensures that even if we were caught entirely off-guard and the soviets did an impossibly good job of targeting our nuclear forces, and say took out 90% of nuclear strike capabilities we would still have sufficient capabilities to utterly devastate them. This is why the nuclear triad exists. How effective would a soviet first strike be at targeting our SSBNs? Can they really track and destroy them at will? Maybe. How effective would it be against our missile silos? Do they know where they all are? Probably. Can they get their bombs on the ground before we can get ours into the air? Maybe. How effective would a soviet strike be against our bomber fleets? Do they know where to strike? Perhaps. Can they disable or destroy our bomber fleets before we can get them into the air? Maybe. But, what are the odds that they can do ALL three simultaneously? Very, very unlikely. And therein lies the truth of deterrence and nuclear detente. If the enemy understands that even in their best case 99% victory scenario you still possess enough capability to utterly devastate them they can and will not risk it.