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Land based missiles aren’t very useful in second strike scenarios because your enemy has already cratered your missile fields in North Dakota. Submarines launch
by erentz 6y ago
Land based missiles aren’t very useful in second strike scenarios because your enemy has already cratered your missile fields in North Dakota. Submarines launched missiles exist entirely for this true second strike capability, one that can’t easily be dispatched with. We must maintain that (presuming we want to maintain second strike capability). That means the land based missiles really are only useful as a first strike function. We take on huge risks at great cost for no good reason. Better to use that $100 billion elsewhere such as R&D for the submarine force.
- baybal2 6y ago> Land based missiles aren’t very useful in second strike scenarios because your enemy has already cratered your missile fields in North Dakota. That's why you need your infrared, and radar satellites. > Submarines launched missiles exist entirely for this true second strike capability, one that can’t easily be dispatched with. At the peak of cold war, up to a half of US SSBNs fleet was tailed by union's submarines. With giant advances in sensing, and computing since the cold war, SSBNs became much easier targets. It's foregone conclusion that your deterrence is stronger if you increase the number of ways you can attack.
- AdamJacobMuller 6y agoMuch like other fundamental mistakes in the article it makes one relevant to the nuclear triad you're discussing as well. > 3,800 warheads [..] for practical purposes, after the first few, they quickly grow redundant. “Once you've dropped a couple of nuclear bombs on a city, if you drop a couple more, all you do is make the rubble shake,” I'm frankly not sure if this is deliberately disingenuous, intended to be hyperbole, or a fundamental lack of understanding of the situation or some combination of all three, but, this is exceptionally wrong. The reason you have 3,800 warheads isn't to aim them all at one city. Remember just as the soviets target our nuclear missile silos we must target theirs. Moreover, having such an extensive fleet of missiles ensures that even if we were caught entirely off-guard and the soviets did an impossibly good job of targeting our nuclear forces, and say took out 90% of nuclear strike capabilities we would still have sufficient capabilities to utterly devastate them. This is why the nuclear triad exists. How effective would a soviet first strike be at targeting our SSBNs? Can they really track and destroy them at will? Maybe. How effective would it be against our missile silos? Do they know where they all are? Probably. Can they get their bombs on the ground before we can get ours into the air? Maybe. How effective would a soviet strike be against our bomber fleets? Do they know where to strike? Perhaps. Can they disable or destroy our bomber fleets before we can get them into the air? Maybe. But, what are the odds that they can do ALL three simultaneously? Very, very unlikely. And therein lies the truth of deterrence and nuclear detente. If the enemy understands that even in their best case 99% victory scenario you still possess enough capability to utterly devastate them they can and will not risk it.