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The current situation, where certificates have SANs in them resembles what PKIX (RFC 2459 etc.) expected from the outset many years ago What actually resulted
by tialaramex 6y ago
The current situation, where certificates have SANs in them resembles what PKIX (RFC 2459 etc.) expected from the outset many years ago
What actually resulted in this finally happening was not the change in the browsers, in fact the browser changes were permitted by the reality that there aren't certificates without SANs any more. Though I agree the browser change does prevent backsliding. Nor was it the change in the Baseline Requirements which spell out that CAs must use SANs.
No, what mattered was Certificate Transparency. Especially mandatory CT, but even just voluntary compliance by CAs eager to show willing before that.
The problem we've most consistently had with CAs isn't that they're deliberately breaking the rules, but that they're incompetent. Which makes sense, humans aren't mostly bad but they are mostly incompetent. So they might intend to comply, but they screw up.
CT allows independent researchers to check stuff. For example after certificates for "private names" (e.g. "hplaserjet" or "myrouter.home") were banned, there was a period when CAs mustn't issue more but had time to revoke any that still existed. After that time limit expired I ran a script to pull out any certificates from CT which (in the script's opinion) seemed to be for private names, yet (again in its opinion) had not been revoked. There shouldn't have been any. But of course there were and the CAs had to clean up their mess.
This allowed us to really clean up several problems with certificates, where a practice was banned, everybody agreed it was banned, but it kept happening anyway. Today if you issue a certificate that shouldn't exist (as we saw recently with that 1024-bit RSA certificate) it's likely to get noticed fairly quickly and you'll have to explain yourself.
- cookiengineer 6y ago> hplaserjet Came here to say this. Many old printers from HP don't work anymore not due to planned obelescence (which is another problem) but due to sheer incompetence. Their web interface allows setting "important" details only via SSL even though their firmware doesn't even have a password or login access feature. The web app will redirect constantly using location headers if you try to use some settings views in the web app via http. Nowadays you cannot use those printers anymore because all Browsers mark them as an insecure context, and therefore are blocking POST XHR requests to manually allowed and installed certificates. So, we now have a generation of tech that made itself useless due to Browser behavior changes and there's no way to fix it without going back to a Windows XP-state operating system that is insecure. I am so annoyed by this. We need open source printing firmwares, because I think it's only gonna get worse in future.
- sep_field 6y agojust put a reverse proxy in front of them
- Symbiote 6y ago> We need open source printing firmwares, it's only gonna get worse in future. I'm not sure if you're aware, but Stallman being denied the source code for a new Xerox printer led to him founding GNU and the FSF. https://www.oreilly.com/openbook/freedom/ch01.html https://www.oreilly.com/openbook/freedom/ch01.html
- tinus_hn 6y agoDidn’t some certificate authorities get caught issueing wildcard certificates for anything to government? I remember Google noticing that because the did manual certificate pinning in their apps.
- tialaramex 6y agoI suspect you're thinking of DigiNotar in 2011, a Dutch outfit which was successfully attacked, perhaps by people working for or on behalf of Iran. The attackers appear to have had effectively full control and issued certificates for *.google.com among other things. DigiNotar - including some related functions for the Dutch government - was distrusted by everybody as a result. But it's also possible you're thinking of TÜRKTRUST, which mistakenly issued Intermediate CA certificates to subscribers asking for leaf certificates, resulting in creation of a google.com certificate issued from one of these bogus intermediates. TurkTrust is no longer trusted by Mozilla but I believe it is still trusted in Windows just locked by the "notBefore" policy to restrict the date range of certificates covered. Or NICCA in India, which I believe was only ever trusted by Windows, and had some problems the full details of which aren't public but included attacks on Google. Or possibly CNNIC, which we know effectively authorised a third party to mint fraudulent certificates as part of some sort of misguided "security" feature and so was distrusted. But probably it's DigiNotar you were thinking of, that's the closest match to your description although "to government" sort of implies this was specifically done on instruction of the Iranian government and I don't think that was ever proven.