4 ms·

While their definition is in the ballpark, its not general enough to handle cases where survival isn't on the line, or communication between non-living systems.

While their definition is in the ballpark, its not general enough to handle cases where survival isn't on the line, or communication between non-living systems. A similar effort is Haig's paper which is broadly compatible with the paper you link but is generic enough to capture semantics broadly: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/13287/1/Strange http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/13287/1/Strange Inversion and Making sense.pdf >An interpreter is a mechanism that uses information in choice. The capabilities of the interpreter couple an entropy of inputs (uncertainty) to an entropy of outputs (indecision). The first entropy is dispelled by observation (input of information ). The second entropy is dispelled by choice of action (output of decision). I propose that an interpreter’s response to inputs (information) be considered the meaning of the information for the interpreter. In this conceptual framework, the designed or evolved mechanisms of interpreters provide the much debated link between Shannon information and semantics.

eternalban 6y ago
It's a bit absurdly reductionist, imo. Not all information is acted upon, and not all actions are sense-response, if we're talking 'starting with Biology'. In any event, if that thesis is in agreement with the prelude's "there can be competence without comprehension", then it follows that without the need for comprehension there are no requirement for any sense of "meaning" in the "competent mechanism". Meaning, as we humans experience it, is fully bound up with consciousness and sense of self. And sometimes it takes multiple 'readings' of the same input for us to arrive at "comprehension". If we resort to black box modeling of sentient organisms, which is fine, we should not be projecting our experience of the phenomena of consciousness and sense of self (agency) to black boxes that can already be modeled as computation. There is zero basis for this, beyond our strong tendency as humans for anthropomorphism. The really interesting question, imho, is whether meaning is secondary to form [which is the prevalent modern orthodoxy], or whether meaning can have an independent existence from form. (The fact that multiple forms can embody the same meaning is a data point.) (Agree with your first para.)
- hackinthebochs 6y ago
  >It's a bit absurdly reductionist, imo. The more reductionist, the better imo. >Meaning, as we humans experience it, is fully bound up with consciousness and sense of self. And it is important to avoid giving meaning an anthropocentric framing which will constrain the analysis too much and thus miss important phenomena. Why should meaning have some qualitative experience associated with it? All sorts of organisms and processes behave in meaningful ways that suggest meaning is embedded in these systems without consciousness. A successful definition of meaning should explain the widespread appearance of meaning in the world. >we should not be projecting our experience of the phenomena of consciousness and sense of self (agency) to black boxes that can already be modeled as computation. But computation is necessarily meaningful! We cannot take some meaningful information, apply an arbitrary sequence of transformations on it, and expect to get meaningful information out. In other words: garbage transformations, garbage out. We see that program can meaningfully transform an input sequence, and that same program will produce garbage with another input sequence. The context of the program, i.e. what input it is operating on, determine what those operations mean, or whether they mean anything at all. The fact that nature picks the useful transformations out of the space of the garbage, or a human programmer picks out the useful transformations needs to be explained. The explanation is that some transformations are meaningful in a given context, and operating in the space of meaning helps guide one through the space of possibility.
  - eternalban 6y ago
    I would much prefer it if [for example] one used 'sense' instead of 'meaning'. For example 'the reaction of processor is the sense of the input'. Why? Because language hygiene matters. There will be inevitable leakage of strictly defined terms of a conceptual model that have far broader scope in the general usage. > But computation is necessarily meaningful! Damn straight, but it is "meaningful!" to the programmer, not the program. :)
    - hackinthebochs 6y ago
      >Damn straight, but it is "meaningful!" to the programmer, not the program. :) But the meaning of the computation exists independent of the programmer. That is, the program doesn't require the existence of a human interpreter to be meaningful. To explain this, it helps to get clear what a computation really is. Essentially, a program takes some input and transforms it to some output. But not just any transformation counts as a computation. What separates transformations that merely increase entropy in the universe and ones that count as computations are the fact that mutual information is preserved across the transformation. The input has mutual information with some system, and the transformation preserves some amount of this mutual information. This is in contrast to destructive transformations where the mutual information is lost entirely. We can further refine the concept by noticing that computations are revelatory, they can tell us something we didn't know about some external system. The result of a computation is such that some new information is revealed about some external system that was inaccessible prior to the computation. Thus we can define a computation as a process that uses an input signal to reduce entropy (the unknown information) with respect to some external system. But mutual information and entropy are not concepts that depend on human interpreters.

eternalban 6y ago

It's a bit absurdly reductionist, imo. Not all information is acted upon, and not all actions are sense-response, if we're talking 'starting with Biology'. In any event, if that thesis is in agreement with the prelude's "there can be competence without comprehension", then it follows that without the need for comprehension there are no requirement for any sense of "meaning" in the "competent mechanism". Meaning, as we humans experience it, is fully bound up with consciousness and sense of self. And sometimes it takes multiple 'readings' of the same input for us to arrive at "comprehension". If we resort to black box modeling of sentient organisms, which is fine, we should not be projecting our experience of the phenomena of consciousness and sense of self (agency) to black boxes that can already be modeled as computation. There is zero basis for this, beyond our strong tendency as humans for anthropomorphism. The really interesting question, imho, is whether meaning is secondary to form [which is the prevalent modern orthodoxy], or whether meaning can have an independent existence from form. (The fact that multiple forms can embody the same meaning is a data point.) (Agree with your first para.)

hackinthebochs 6y ago
>It's a bit absurdly reductionist, imo. The more reductionist, the better imo. >Meaning, as we humans experience it, is fully bound up with consciousness and sense of self. And it is important to avoid giving meaning an anthropocentric framing which will constrain the analysis too much and thus miss important phenomena. Why should meaning have some qualitative experience associated with it? All sorts of organisms and processes behave in meaningful ways that suggest meaning is embedded in these systems without consciousness. A successful definition of meaning should explain the widespread appearance of meaning in the world. >we should not be projecting our experience of the phenomena of consciousness and sense of self (agency) to black boxes that can already be modeled as computation. But computation is necessarily meaningful! We cannot take some meaningful information, apply an arbitrary sequence of transformations on it, and expect to get meaningful information out. In other words: garbage transformations, garbage out. We see that program can meaningfully transform an input sequence, and that same program will produce garbage with another input sequence. The context of the program, i.e. what input it is operating on, determine what those operations mean, or whether they mean anything at all. The fact that nature picks the useful transformations out of the space of the garbage, or a human programmer picks out the useful transformations needs to be explained. The explanation is that some transformations are meaningful in a given context, and operating in the space of meaning helps guide one through the space of possibility.
- eternalban 6y ago
  I would much prefer it if [for example] one used 'sense' instead of 'meaning'. For example 'the reaction of processor is the sense of the input'. Why? Because language hygiene matters. There will be inevitable leakage of strictly defined terms of a conceptual model that have far broader scope in the general usage. > But computation is necessarily meaningful! Damn straight, but it is "meaningful!" to the programmer, not the program. :)
  - hackinthebochs 6y ago
    >Damn straight, but it is "meaningful!" to the programmer, not the program. :) But the meaning of the computation exists independent of the programmer. That is, the program doesn't require the existence of a human interpreter to be meaningful. To explain this, it helps to get clear what a computation really is. Essentially, a program takes some input and transforms it to some output. But not just any transformation counts as a computation. What separates transformations that merely increase entropy in the universe and ones that count as computations are the fact that mutual information is preserved across the transformation. The input has mutual information with some system, and the transformation preserves some amount of this mutual information. This is in contrast to destructive transformations where the mutual information is lost entirely. We can further refine the concept by noticing that computations are revelatory, they can tell us something we didn't know about some external system. The result of a computation is such that some new information is revealed about some external system that was inaccessible prior to the computation. Thus we can define a computation as a process that uses an input signal to reduce entropy (the unknown information) with respect to some external system. But mutual information and entropy are not concepts that depend on human interpreters.