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Where do you draw the line between blaming the UX and blaming the training process, or the inevitable cases where an irreversible decision made under uncertaint

Where do you draw the line between blaming the UX and blaming the training process, or the inevitable cases where an irreversible decision made under uncertainty turned out to be the wrong one? Some level of training is certainly needed, so in my naive view anyway, it makes no sense to attribute every error to UX. For example, let's say a pilot belly-lands because they failed to lower their landing gear, possibly because they were distracted by some other equipment failure, or possibly because sometimes qualified and experienced pilots do this. This error could have been avoided with, say, an automated spoken "gear up" warning instead of a nonverbal warning horn (I have no idea if some aircraft already have this). But it could also have been avoided by longer and more extensive training, right?

capableweb 6y ago
> But it could also have been avoided by longer and more extensive training, right? Sure, it maybe could, but why risk it? Humans are also humans, and even pilots with endless amount of flight time does mistakes sometimes, because we're all humans. The idea is to work with the idea that sometimes we fail, even if we are well trained, so when failures happen, it's easy to recover. > Where do you draw the line between blaming the UX and blaming the training process, or the inevitable cases where an irreversible decision made under uncertainty turned out to be the wrong one? Basically, it's always the UX. If there is a case where the pilot made the wrong decision, something needs to change so if a pilot with similar experience, wouldn't have made that decision with a different UX. Basically force the pilots to do the right decision, always. I'm not 100% on the history of all of this, so if someone is more familiar with it, please correct me. But I think it started with "Crew resource management" to ensure proper training of the crew. It has gone through many iterations where less and less blame is being made on the crew and more on the equipment. I think the point of the current iteration basically boils down to "Human-error will happen, let's plan for it and if human-error lead to a plane going down, let's fix it so the same error would be prevented".
- NovemberWhiskey 6y ago
  >Basically, it's always the UX. If there is a case where the pilot made the wrong decision, something needs to change so if a pilot with similar experience, wouldn't have made that decision with a different UX. Basically force the pilots to do the right decision, always. That's not realistic. If you think it is realistic, please take a look at the investigation report for PK8303. Some pilots will disregard alerts, override safeties and ignore procedures: there's only so much a system can do to promote good decision-making. https://www.caapakistan.com.pk/Upload/SIBReports/AAIB-431.pdf https://www.caapakistan.com.pk/Upload/SIBReports/AAIB-431.pd...
- thaumasiotes 6y ago
  > If there is a case where the pilot made the wrong decision, something needs to change so if a pilot with similar experience, wouldn't have made that decision with a different UX. Basically force the pilots to do the right decision, always. If it were possible to do this, we wouldn't have pilots at all.
hugh-avherald 6y ago
It's worth noting that generally in aviation when a UX is blamed, the UX is very, very far from perfect.
ska 6y ago
> But it could also have been avoided by longer and more extensive training, right? Generally in this sort of risk analysis there is a hierarchy of mitigation, and the least of them is training. e.g. when you find a potentially hazardous situation, the best thing you can do is design the system so that it can't happen. Failing that, you design in an procedural or workflow aspect that naturally avoids it. Failing that, you put in a system to force the use to confirm or review the action. Failing that, you train around it. A common sign of a flawed design process is when things get pushed into the "train around it" bucket late in the process, not because they were unavoidable, but because they were looked at too late in the design to effectively make changes.
- sokoloff 6y ago
  > Failing that, you design in an procedural or workflow aspect that naturally avoids it. Failing that, you put in a system to force the use to confirm or review the action. Failing that, you train around it. I view the procedural or workflow aspect as a subset of training. As an example, I always lower the gear and leave my hand on the gear selector until I see three green (gear safe) lights prior to selecting any flaps. The operating handbook and factory checklists do not require this, but my planning and training has elected this optional workflow/procedure. Why? Because it's incredibly hard to get my airplane to slow down and come down for landing while completely clean (no flaps, no gear). If I use the factory accepted procedure to select approach flaps, I can get it slow enough to land. I've literally never seen a "pilot forgot the gear" airplane sitting on the runway with no flaps deployed.
  - ska 6y ago
    I wasn't very articulate there, but by a procedural or workflow aspect I mean something like: the workflow will lead you through a series of actions that will make it physically impossible or unlikely to [do the dangerous thing]. This is different than [system can't do the dangerous thing]. It's also different, and safer, than relying on user actions outside your control. Example: I have a mechanical system moving fast with enough mass to hurt the operator, so I put the control on the other side of the machine (i.e. machine body between person and the dangerous part), and require the operator to hold a switch "on" for the entire time the machine is moving. This doesn't make it impossible for the machine to hurt the operator, of course, but it makes it a lot less likely - and it doesn't rely on training at all. While you can also rely on training aspects like you describe (a good idea!) it's not the same thing. I don't know aircraft, so I don't know if there is something equivalent but I wouldn't be surprised. Anything you simply have to do with two hands on disparate controls?
sokoloff 6y ago
There are configuration warning systems (most are aural tones, though there are available spoken systems). There are two challenges with a gear warning system: When to trigger it. How to present it. In my aircraft, it's triggered by ((no gear safe indication) and ((full flaps) or (very low throttle setting))). The presentation is a loud, alternating warning tone and a red "Gear Unsafe" light directly in my field of view on the glareshield. These are not silenceable by button as is common on training aircraft. Even though a handful are inadvertently geared up every year, I'm not convinced that better warning systems would significantly reduce the rate. Better training would. If I ever do the deed, I'll be the first to admit that I was the primary cause and that I failed not only to follow the checklist, but my own SOPs and flew the aircraft onto the runway with a large red light right in front of me and a blaring horn. Making it a voice seems not likely to help. If I gear it up after an electrical failure [which some of the inadvertent ones are], that's probably slightly more understandable (and a scenario in which an additional, electrically powered, warning system would presumably also be INOP).

capableweb 6y ago

> But it could also have been avoided by longer and more extensive training, right? Sure, it maybe could, but why risk it? Humans are also humans, and even pilots with endless amount of flight time does mistakes sometimes, because we're all humans. The idea is to work with the idea that sometimes we fail, even if we are well trained, so when failures happen, it's easy to recover. > Where do you draw the line between blaming the UX and blaming the training process, or the inevitable cases where an irreversible decision made under uncertainty turned out to be the wrong one? Basically, it's always the UX. If there is a case where the pilot made the wrong decision, something needs to change so if a pilot with similar experience, wouldn't have made that decision with a different UX. Basically force the pilots to do the right decision, always. I'm not 100% on the history of all of this, so if someone is more familiar with it, please correct me. But I think it started with "Crew resource management" to ensure proper training of the crew. It has gone through many iterations where less and less blame is being made on the crew and more on the equipment. I think the point of the current iteration basically boils down to "Human-error will happen, let's plan for it and if human-error lead to a plane going down, let's fix it so the same error would be prevented".

NovemberWhiskey 6y ago
>Basically, it's always the UX. If there is a case where the pilot made the wrong decision, something needs to change so if a pilot with similar experience, wouldn't have made that decision with a different UX. Basically force the pilots to do the right decision, always. That's not realistic. If you think it is realistic, please take a look at the investigation report for PK8303. Some pilots will disregard alerts, override safeties and ignore procedures: there's only so much a system can do to promote good decision-making. https://www.caapakistan.com.pk/Upload/SIBReports/AAIB-431.pdf https://www.caapakistan.com.pk/Upload/SIBReports/AAIB-431.pd...
thaumasiotes 6y ago
> If there is a case where the pilot made the wrong decision, something needs to change so if a pilot with similar experience, wouldn't have made that decision with a different UX. Basically force the pilots to do the right decision, always. If it were possible to do this, we wouldn't have pilots at all.

hugh-avherald 6y ago

It's worth noting that generally in aviation when a UX is blamed, the UX is very, very far from perfect.

ska 6y ago

> But it could also have been avoided by longer and more extensive training, right? Generally in this sort of risk analysis there is a hierarchy of mitigation, and the least of them is training. e.g. when you find a potentially hazardous situation, the best thing you can do is design the system so that it can't happen. Failing that, you design in an procedural or workflow aspect that naturally avoids it. Failing that, you put in a system to force the use to confirm or review the action. Failing that, you train around it. A common sign of a flawed design process is when things get pushed into the "train around it" bucket late in the process, not because they were unavoidable, but because they were looked at too late in the design to effectively make changes.

sokoloff 6y ago
> Failing that, you design in an procedural or workflow aspect that naturally avoids it. Failing that, you put in a system to force the use to confirm or review the action. Failing that, you train around it. I view the procedural or workflow aspect as a subset of training. As an example, I always lower the gear and leave my hand on the gear selector until I see three green (gear safe) lights prior to selecting any flaps. The operating handbook and factory checklists do not require this, but my planning and training has elected this optional workflow/procedure. Why? Because it's incredibly hard to get my airplane to slow down and come down for landing while completely clean (no flaps, no gear). If I use the factory accepted procedure to select approach flaps, I can get it slow enough to land. I've literally never seen a "pilot forgot the gear" airplane sitting on the runway with no flaps deployed.
- ska 6y ago
  I wasn't very articulate there, but by a procedural or workflow aspect I mean something like: the workflow will lead you through a series of actions that will make it physically impossible or unlikely to [do the dangerous thing]. This is different than [system can't do the dangerous thing]. It's also different, and safer, than relying on user actions outside your control. Example: I have a mechanical system moving fast with enough mass to hurt the operator, so I put the control on the other side of the machine (i.e. machine body between person and the dangerous part), and require the operator to hold a switch "on" for the entire time the machine is moving. This doesn't make it impossible for the machine to hurt the operator, of course, but it makes it a lot less likely - and it doesn't rely on training at all. While you can also rely on training aspects like you describe (a good idea!) it's not the same thing. I don't know aircraft, so I don't know if there is something equivalent but I wouldn't be surprised. Anything you simply have to do with two hands on disparate controls?

sokoloff 6y ago

There are configuration warning systems (most are aural tones, though there are available spoken systems). There are two challenges with a gear warning system: When to trigger it. How to present it. In my aircraft, it's triggered by ((no gear safe indication) and ((full flaps) or (very low throttle setting))). The presentation is a loud, alternating warning tone and a red "Gear Unsafe" light directly in my field of view on the glareshield. These are not silenceable by button as is common on training aircraft. Even though a handful are inadvertently geared up every year, I'm not convinced that better warning systems would significantly reduce the rate. Better training would. If I ever do the deed, I'll be the first to admit that I was the primary cause and that I failed not only to follow the checklist, but my own SOPs and flew the aircraft onto the runway with a large red light right in front of me and a blaring horn. Making it a voice seems not likely to help. If I gear it up after an electrical failure [which some of the inadvertent ones are], that's probably slightly more understandable (and a scenario in which an additional, electrically powered, warning system would presumably also be INOP).