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This is also not a new idea that even comes from the software world. I'm not entirely sure of the original of such ideas, but the first time I heard about was i

This is also not a new idea that even comes from the software world. I'm not entirely sure of the original of such ideas, but the first time I heard about was in conjunction with airplanes and their UX. Basically, crashes and other issues from flying is never attributed to the operator, but the UX of the controls as if it was done better, would have prevented the operator of committing the error in the first place.

CPLX 6y ago
Indeed. One of the really core things you learn when you dig deeper into aviation is that essentially every major disaster is a chained combination of multiple extremely unlikely failures in sequence. Which is a testament to both the incredible success this approach has had, as well as the impossibility of perfection.
- Gare 6y ago
  So called "Swiss cheese model": https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swiss_cheese_model https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swiss_cheese_model
- alpaca128 6y ago
  I once saw a detailed breakdown of a well-known Concorde crash and it's staggering how many coincidences came together to mess up those people's day. Iirc a spare part for another plane was faulty, fell off onto the runway, the Concorde's wheels hit it and exploded due to the strain, one of the rubber chunks hit the fuel tanks causing a leak and another shredded some live wires, leading to ignition of the leaking fuel.
  - andi999 6y ago
    Isn't almost everything the fuel tank? So I would say these events are not all independent.
  - GuB-42 6y ago
    It wasn't the first time the Concorde had exploded tires. There already was several "close calls". The last one was for real, with the power of hindsight, they should have addressed the problem long before the deadly crash. For me, the best illustration is the Tenerife airport disaster, the deadliest accident in the history of aviation. Two Boeing 747 crashing into each other on the runway during takeoff. Circumstances included fog, problems in the control tower, nonstandard phraseology, radio interference and overworked personnel.
EForEndeavour 6y ago
Where do you draw the line between blaming the UX and blaming the training process, or the inevitable cases where an irreversible decision made under uncertainty turned out to be the wrong one? Some level of training is certainly needed, so in my naive view anyway, it makes no sense to attribute every error to UX. For example, let's say a pilot belly-lands because they failed to lower their landing gear, possibly because they were distracted by some other equipment failure, or possibly because sometimes qualified and experienced pilots do this. This error could have been avoided with, say, an automated spoken "gear up" warning instead of a nonverbal warning horn (I have no idea if some aircraft already have this). But it could also have been avoided by longer and more extensive training, right?
- capableweb 6y ago
  > But it could also have been avoided by longer and more extensive training, right? Sure, it maybe could, but why risk it? Humans are also humans, and even pilots with endless amount of flight time does mistakes sometimes, because we're all humans. The idea is to work with the idea that sometimes we fail, even if we are well trained, so when failures happen, it's easy to recover. > Where do you draw the line between blaming the UX and blaming the training process, or the inevitable cases where an irreversible decision made under uncertainty turned out to be the wrong one? Basically, it's always the UX. If there is a case where the pilot made the wrong decision, something needs to change so if a pilot with similar experience, wouldn't have made that decision with a different UX. Basically force the pilots to do the right decision, always. I'm not 100% on the history of all of this, so if someone is more familiar with it, please correct me. But I think it started with "Crew resource management" to ensure proper training of the crew. It has gone through many iterations where less and less blame is being made on the crew and more on the equipment. I think the point of the current iteration basically boils down to "Human-error will happen, let's plan for it and if human-error lead to a plane going down, let's fix it so the same error would be prevented".
  - NovemberWhiskey 6y ago
    >Basically, it's always the UX. If there is a case where the pilot made the wrong decision, something needs to change so if a pilot with similar experience, wouldn't have made that decision with a different UX. Basically force the pilots to do the right decision, always. That's not realistic. If you think it is realistic, please take a look at the investigation report for PK8303. Some pilots will disregard alerts, override safeties and ignore procedures: there's only so much a system can do to promote good decision-making. https://www.caapakistan.com.pk/Upload/SIBReports/AAIB-431.pdf https://www.caapakistan.com.pk/Upload/SIBReports/AAIB-431.pd...

CPLX 6y ago

Indeed. One of the really core things you learn when you dig deeper into aviation is that essentially every major disaster is a chained combination of multiple extremely unlikely failures in sequence. Which is a testament to both the incredible success this approach has had, as well as the impossibility of perfection.

Gare 6y ago
So called "Swiss cheese model": https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swiss_cheese_model https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swiss_cheese_model
alpaca128 6y ago
I once saw a detailed breakdown of a well-known Concorde crash and it's staggering how many coincidences came together to mess up those people's day. Iirc a spare part for another plane was faulty, fell off onto the runway, the Concorde's wheels hit it and exploded due to the strain, one of the rubber chunks hit the fuel tanks causing a leak and another shredded some live wires, leading to ignition of the leaking fuel.
- andi999 6y ago
  Isn't almost everything the fuel tank? So I would say these events are not all independent.
- GuB-42 6y ago
  It wasn't the first time the Concorde had exploded tires. There already was several "close calls". The last one was for real, with the power of hindsight, they should have addressed the problem long before the deadly crash. For me, the best illustration is the Tenerife airport disaster, the deadliest accident in the history of aviation. Two Boeing 747 crashing into each other on the runway during takeoff. Circumstances included fog, problems in the control tower, nonstandard phraseology, radio interference and overworked personnel.

EForEndeavour 6y ago

Where do you draw the line between blaming the UX and blaming the training process, or the inevitable cases where an irreversible decision made under uncertainty turned out to be the wrong one? Some level of training is certainly needed, so in my naive view anyway, it makes no sense to attribute every error to UX. For example, let's say a pilot belly-lands because they failed to lower their landing gear, possibly because they were distracted by some other equipment failure, or possibly because sometimes qualified and experienced pilots do this. This error could have been avoided with, say, an automated spoken "gear up" warning instead of a nonverbal warning horn (I have no idea if some aircraft already have this). But it could also have been avoided by longer and more extensive training, right?

capableweb 6y ago
> But it could also have been avoided by longer and more extensive training, right? Sure, it maybe could, but why risk it? Humans are also humans, and even pilots with endless amount of flight time does mistakes sometimes, because we're all humans. The idea is to work with the idea that sometimes we fail, even if we are well trained, so when failures happen, it's easy to recover. > Where do you draw the line between blaming the UX and blaming the training process, or the inevitable cases where an irreversible decision made under uncertainty turned out to be the wrong one? Basically, it's always the UX. If there is a case where the pilot made the wrong decision, something needs to change so if a pilot with similar experience, wouldn't have made that decision with a different UX. Basically force the pilots to do the right decision, always. I'm not 100% on the history of all of this, so if someone is more familiar with it, please correct me. But I think it started with "Crew resource management" to ensure proper training of the crew. It has gone through many iterations where less and less blame is being made on the crew and more on the equipment. I think the point of the current iteration basically boils down to "Human-error will happen, let's plan for it and if human-error lead to a plane going down, let's fix it so the same error would be prevented".
- NovemberWhiskey 6y ago
  >Basically, it's always the UX. If there is a case where the pilot made the wrong decision, something needs to change so if a pilot with similar experience, wouldn't have made that decision with a different UX. Basically force the pilots to do the right decision, always. That's not realistic. If you think it is realistic, please take a look at the investigation report for PK8303. Some pilots will disregard alerts, override safeties and ignore procedures: there's only so much a system can do to promote good decision-making. https://www.caapakistan.com.pk/Upload/SIBReports/AAIB-431.pdf https://www.caapakistan.com.pk/Upload/SIBReports/AAIB-431.pd...