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"How does matter make mind? More specifically, how does a physical object generate subjective experiences like those you are immersed in as you read this senten
by Bluestein 6y ago
"How does matter make mind? More specifically, how does a physical object generate subjective experiences like those you are immersed in as you read this sentence? How does stuff become conscious? This is called the mind-body problem, or, by philosopher David Chalmers, the 'hard problem.'"
I expressed doubt that the hard problem can be solved--a position called mysterianism--in The End of Science. I argue in a new edition that my pessimism has been justified by the recent popularity of panpsychism. This ancient doctrine holds that consciousness is a property not just of brains but of all matter, like my table and coffee mug.
Panpsychism strikes me as self-evidently foolish, but non-foolish people—notably Chalmers and neuroscientist Christof Koch—are taking it seriously. How can that be? What’s compelling their interest? Have I dismissed panpsychism too hastily?"
- morpheos137 6y agoI think I agree with mysterianism (new term for me). My take is that consciousness does not need or permit an explanation (c.f. Goedel Incompleteness) and no new information about the world can be found by attempting to formulate one. In practical, empirical terms it makes no difference if experience is subjective or just an objective illusion of subjectivity. It is of no use and akin to sophistry. I think Chalmers is a charlatan or just making a living off of being confused himself and reality is more toward Daniel Dennet. However panpsychism may be true but empirically unprovable. It is kind of like the old "if a tree falls in a forest does it make a sound?" question. "If a being thinks that consciousness is separate and essential to the process of *thinking, does that make that being conscious?" *Provided feelings count as thought.