4 ms·
Apart from Tarsnap, maybe Duplicity http://duplicity.nongnu.org http://duplicity.nongnu.org?
by dchest 15y ago
Apart from Tarsnap, maybe Duplicity http://duplicity.nongnu.org http://duplicity.nongnu.org?
- cperciva 15y agoAgreed. There are some things I dislike about duplicity (e.g., its reliance upon GPG) but it's probably what I would use if I couldn't use Tarsnap.
- click170 15y agoWhat makes you shy away from backup apps that rely on GPG?
- cperciva 15y agoGPG is big and complicated. The more code you have the more likely it is that you'll have security vulnerabilities. (This is especially true for code like GPG which reads attacker-provided inputs, since it allows the attacker to pick which of many code paths get invoked.)
- tptacek 15y agoCryptographers hate GPG. GPG is ugly as sin†. Unfortunately (and I mean that only with a little bit of snark), GPG mostly still works, in the sense of standing up to active, informed attackers with modern techniques. † For instance, look how it handles message integrity.
- cperciva 15y agoYour definition of "mostly still works" is "it's secure as long as you ignore the vulnerabilities people keep on finding"?
- tptacek 15y agoThis is a slippery slope argument that ends in you arguing that the best tested cryptosystem in common use (TLS) is also insecure. All cryptosystems have vulnerabilities; the question is, how workable is the system after those flaws are fixed.
- cperciva 15y agoWell, yes. I also think SSL is too complicated for people to get right. ;-)
- tptacek 15y agoFor the record, I respect the critiques practitioners have of GPG. Unfortunately, their alternatives tend to be ad-hoc. There should be a clean, simple, GPG-like standard, perhaps based on ECC and AE cipher constructions, to replace GPG. But until that happens, in the choice between ugly and workable vs. simple and fragile, ugly and workable is the right choice for most people. As always I think you drastically underestimate how dangerous this stuff is because you've dedicated your career to it, while normal implementors --- even crypto enthusiasts (look at Tor and SSH) --- have little of the nuance required to get it right. I like the fundamentals of TLS more than you do; I don't think it's a bad or needlessly complex protocol (except maybe session resumption). I see that reasonable people can differ on that point. But, very importantly, TLS is also a vehicle for collecting and implementing the best known methods in cryptography. I think you tend to overlook that. As always, my opinions are as a software security practitioner and not as a cryptographer, since I am not one.
- sigil 15y agoIt sounds like Colin is taking issue with openssl the implementation, while you're defending TLS the protocol. In that case, I agree with you both. (As an aside, it's great to see two of my favorite HN commenters in the security field engaged in conversation at this level.)
- tptacek 15y ago
- chirayuk 15y agoSpiderOak? https://spideroak.com/ https://spideroak.com/ If TarSnap had iPhone, etc. versions, I would use it for everything. (the permission specific keys are just awesome.)