5 ms·
Given the available options, what's the best option for automated backups?
by PonyGumbo 15y ago
Given the available options, what's the best option for automated backups?
- cperciva 15y agoI use Tarsnap. ;-)
- acqq 15y agoI took a look https://www.tarsnap.com/gettingstarted.html https://www.tarsnap.com/gettingstarted.html and I don't understand why "If you have multiple machines, you almost certainly want to create a separate key file for each machine."? Can you explain why, if I'd like to access the same data from the different machines? Or is the main assumption that every machine has its own, nor shareable, backup? Isn't the main advantage of an online service to have the same data accessible from more machines?
- dchest 15y agoApart from Tarsnap, maybe Duplicity http://duplicity.nongnu.org http://duplicity.nongnu.org?
- cperciva 15y agoAgreed. There are some things I dislike about duplicity (e.g., its reliance upon GPG) but it's probably what I would use if I couldn't use Tarsnap.
- click170 15y agoWhat makes you shy away from backup apps that rely on GPG?
- cperciva 15y agoGPG is big and complicated. The more code you have the more likely it is that you'll have security vulnerabilities. (This is especially true for code like GPG which reads attacker-provided inputs, since it allows the attacker to pick which of many code paths get invoked.)
- tptacek 15y agoCryptographers hate GPG. GPG is ugly as sin†. Unfortunately (and I mean that only with a little bit of snark), GPG mostly still works, in the sense of standing up to active, informed attackers with modern techniques. † For instance, look how it handles message integrity.
- cperciva 15y agoYour definition of "mostly still works" is "it's secure as long as you ignore the vulnerabilities people keep on finding"?
- tptacek 15y agoThis is a slippery slope argument that ends in you arguing that the best tested cryptosystem in common use (TLS) is also insecure. All cryptosystems have vulnerabilities; the question is, how workable is the system after those flaws are fixed.
- 15y ago
- chirayuk 15y agoSpiderOak? https://spideroak.com/ https://spideroak.com/ If TarSnap had iPhone, etc. versions, I would use it for everything. (the permission specific keys are just awesome.)
- gst 15y agoDepends. On my server I use Tarsnap. On my client I use Wuala's "backup folder" feature.
- masnick 15y agoWhat about Arq for Mac? http://www.haystacksoftware.com/arq/ http://www.haystacksoftware.com/arq/ It is/was used by Chris Wanstrath (of github), among others. http://chris.wanstrath.usesthis.com http://chris.wanstrath.usesthis.com
- tptacek 15y agoArq appears to have similar flaws to JungleDisk, judging from its file format specification.
- masnick 15y agoArq says they don't think so: https://twitter.com/#!/arqbackup/status/76693981286768641 https://twitter.com/#!/arqbackup/status/76693981286768641
- tptacek 15y agoThey don't publish their key derivation scheme, but I'd be shocked (and pleased) to find that they were savvy enough to actually use PBKDF2 or even stretched SHA1. Believe it or not, plenty of commercial vendors literally take the ASCII of the password as the key. I'd also worry, based on that spec, that the Arq developers believe the SHA1 hashes they store are fully equivalent to a deliberate MAC. I should have noted that Arq's git-like scheme makes them inherently more careful about storage and data integrity (under non-adversarial conditions) than Jungledisk. My perusal of their site was casual. I really don't know much about them and am not offering a professional opinion.
- sreitshamer 15y agoI emailed you asking for professional help in reviewing the security aspects of Arq. I'm not an expert, and I'd like to get it right. If anybody else has the expertise to do this review, please email me at stefan@haystacksoftware.com. One way or another I want to get this right.
- MarketingMuppet 15y agoSpideroak (https://spideroak.com https://spideroak.com) is also a secure option.