9 ms·
Insecurity in the Jungle (disk)
- drivebyacct2 15y agoI continue to not understand how people imagine these services working (de-dupe, block level updates, etc) without access to the unsecured version of the data. As for the claims about what Amazon could do to your data... there's even less sinister options. S3 is not 100% safe storage. There's a chance for bit rot and that may occur. If you don't check the file yourself, you won't know. Again, that seems a bit inevitable, no? edit: left out a 'not'
- cperciva 15y agoThere's a sucker born every minute. Jungle Disk claims to be secure, and most people believe them -- most people have no way to assess whether they're doing things right or not.
- gst 15y agoDe-dupe: Wuala encrypts the file with a key derived from the file itself. This key is then encrypted with the user's key and both (the file and the encrypted key) are uploaded to the cloud. Disadvantage: If the file is known to an attacker (i.e., a copyright holder) the attacker can possibly find out which users have access to this file. Advantage: Allows for de-duplication, but is more secure than Dropbox. Block-level updates: I don't see a problem with this. Partition the file into blocks on the client (before the encryption). The server doesn't need access to the data for this.
- tptacek 15y agoAs Steve Weis pointed out in an earlier thread about schemes like this, deriving keys from the contents of files breaks semantic security. Lay engineers reason about this problem the way you just did: "the RIAA can tell I have Lady Gaga MP3s". But practitioners are worried about much more subtle and devastating flaws, particularly in cases where attackers may exercise some control over the blocks being encrypted. Any scheme that derives passwords from file contents gives me the willies.
- drivebyacct2 15y agoMost file-level encryption that I'm aware destroys benefits of blocked data. For example, changing a few bytes in an encrypted file will cause MANY bytes to change in the actual file on the disk... at least with ecryptfs and truecrypt. If there is an encryption scheme that works well with striping, I'd really super appreciate you pointing me in that direction - it would greatly help with a problem I'm currently trying to solve.
- PonyGumbo 15y agoGiven the available options, what's the best option for automated backups?
- cperciva 15y agoI use Tarsnap. ;-)
- acqq 15y agoI took a look https://www.tarsnap.com/gettingstarted.html https://www.tarsnap.com/gettingstarted.html and I don't understand why "If you have multiple machines, you almost certainly want to create a separate key file for each machine."? Can you explain why, if I'd like to access the same data from the different machines? Or is the main assumption that every machine has its own, nor shareable, backup? Isn't the main advantage of an online service to have the same data accessible from more machines?
- dchest 15y agoApart from Tarsnap, maybe Duplicity http://duplicity.nongnu.org http://duplicity.nongnu.org?
- cperciva 15y agoAgreed. There are some things I dislike about duplicity (e.g., its reliance upon GPG) but it's probably what I would use if I couldn't use Tarsnap.
- imajes 15y ago@cperciva: Thanks for this; now i'll convert my 8char ascii system password to a 10char one. Do you have any data showing how large a password needs to be to make it ridiculously expensive for a TLA (gency) to commit a large amount of hardware to cracking? i.e. how much time past the 10chars does it consume ?
- cperciva 15y agoIt depends on your KDF. MD5 is ridiculously weak; the standard MD5-crypt is 1000 times stronger; bcrypt is better yet; and scrypt is vastly stronger. The best source for this my scrypt paper, really.
- dchest 15y agoLink: http://www.tarsnap.com/scrypt.html http://www.tarsnap.com/scrypt.html
- SoftwareMaven 15y agoWhat license is the scrypt code released under?
- tptacek 15y agoIt's BSD licensed but probably not easy to integrate on your platform. BCrypt is an easier choice. When we see Java and .NET implementations of scrypt, we'll start recommending it, but I'll be honest and tell you that we rarely recommend scrypt today.
- inklesspen 15y agohttp://xkcd.com/538/ http://xkcd.com/538/
- Splines 15y agoTrue enough, if you're targeted it's not going to help very much. However, like outrunning a bear, you only need to be harder to catch than the guy behind you.
- tptacek 15y agoSummary: Jungledisk doesn't protect the integrity of encrypted data, and doesn't securely derive keys and is thus vulnerable to fast offline attacks. The thing Jungledisk right is to use the same block cipher mode as Tarsnap (and, incidentally, virtually every mainstream encrypted storage system). The impact of using unauthenticated encryption to store data is that your backup provider could end up owning your machine. Attackers can carefully choose which data to corrupt. They can exploit the randomization of corrupted decryption to set up conditions for memory corruption exploits, and, in more sophisticated but totally realistic attacks, exploit guesses about known plaintext to produce attacker-controlled nonrandom plaintexts. A backup provider with client-authenticated crypto can't do that, because the keys that encrypt the data also ensure it's integrity. The password storage issue is no different than any other password storage problem; again, direct your attention to http://codahale.com/how-to-safely-store-a-password/ http://codahale.com/how-to-safely-store-a-password/, mentally substituting "storage of password hash" to "derivation of AES key". To my mind, the key derivation is the real problem here. A surprisingly large number of secure encryption storage products don't ensure data integrity. Realistic attacks against that vulnerability are feasible but difficult: you'd have to be targeted. If you're going to write an article about how a competitor's encryption is inferior to yours and cast it as a vulnerability report, I'd suggest not recommending your own encryption scheme as the replacement. The scrypt recommendation in this article sticks out like a sore thumb. Virtually nothing uses scrypt. We can nerd out on CTR mode vs. CBC mode; I'm starting to come around to Colin's take on CTR because of ciphertext indistinguishability as I see more practical vulnerabilities that take advantage of it. I think the padding issue is a red herring. CBC padding is easier to get right than absolute rock solid reliable generation of CTR nonces and absolute rock solid management of CTR counters, which are things I see people get wrong regularly. Distinguishability is the real problem with CBC.
- cperciva 15y agoTo my mind, the key derivation is the real problem here. A surprisingly large number of secure encryption storage products don't ensure data integrity. Realistic attacks against that vulnerability are feasible but difficult: you'd have to be targeted. I think the lack of integrity is more important than you're making it sound. There's a lot of situations where a lack of integrity can be exploited to create a lack of privacy too. But the main reason I mentioned the lack of integrity first is that I needed to mention the lack of HMAC to explain why they had the ridiculous "salted key hash" construct. If you're going to write an article about how a competitor's encryption is inferior to yours and cast it as a vulnerability report, I'd suggest not recommending your own encryption scheme as the replacement. The scrypt recommendation in this article sticks out like a sore thumb. Virtually nothing uses scrypt. I think you're misstating what I wrote a bit. I said that scrypt is the state of the art in the field -- which it is -- and that given that Jungle Disk was around before I developed scrypt, they should have used PBKDF2 or bcrypt.
- rarrrrrr 15y agoMy understanding is that SpiderOak, Tarsnap, and Wuala all do this correctly (using one of PBKDF2, bcrypt, or scrypt.) Colin - Perhaps the companies in the backup space that put effort into handling this carefully should work together and create a PSA style website with a matrix chart of how the varies providers handle "encrypted" data. Make it a separate domain and do our best to be elaborately objective about it. Any interest?
- tptacek 15y agoWhat block cipher mode does SpiderOak use, and how does it verify the authenticity of its data? Tarsnap goes through a lot of extra trouble to MAC its data; few other providers do. You'd hate to see everyone treat key derivation as a shorthand for "doing all of encryption right". I looked on the SpiderOak site, saw a lot of material on how keys are derived and not stored on SpiderOak servers (great!), but didn't see a lot of details about the mechanics of actually encrypting and checking data.
- rarrrrrr 15y agoThanks for asking. If you're interested, would be very happy to discuss SpiderOak's crypto strategy in depth with you the next time I'm in Chicago. Could share source code, etc. IMO, most interesting parts are the key scoping, which allow users to selectively publish ("share") portions of stored data by publishing the appropriately scoped keys. SpiderOak uses AES256 in CFB mode with authentication via HMAC. The code is careful about unique nonce/counter usage, crypto code is confined to specific modules that rarely change, and reviewed by cryptographers outside SpiderOak. Client and server have minimal trust relationship. Being paranoid about data integrity (not only because of crypto issues, but also because bitrot happens routinely at petabyte scale) the data authentication happens repetitively at a few different layers. From all end user devices, we see about one bit error per 4.2tb of upload transactions.
- Locke1689 15y agoWhy CFB vs CTR? Is there some reason parallelization is unneeded or impossible?
- euroclydon 15y agoIf, like me, you're wondering: "Does 1Password use all the stuff?" http://agilebits.com/products/1Password/user_guide http://agilebits.com/products/1Password/user_guide
- jmtulloss 15y agoMore details here: http://help.agilebits.com/1Password3/agile_keychain_design.html http://help.agilebits.com/1Password3/agile_keychain_design.h...
- euroclydon 15y agoThanks, that's the page I was on -- stupid AJAX navigation! Anyway, the document seems *nix specific. Does Windows have a /dev/random?
- kevindication 15y agoStupid question: Why is the 34 character password easier to crack than the 8 character password? (Upon re-reading I think I may have missed the assumption that the long password only contains english text, no punctuation, numerics, etc.)
- cperciva 15y agoYes, the 34-character is English text.