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> But at least it's a case study from history. It doesn’t substantiate your claim that taxation is inescapable. > It is difficult to agree on a definition, be

> But at least it's a case study from history. It doesn’t substantiate your claim that taxation is inescapable. > It is difficult to agree on a definition, because once you suggest that any law with punitive measures is invalid, no matter how light the punishment is or how innocuous the law is, you can denounce anything from taxation to property rights to jaywalking as built on coercion. I agree that it is difficult to define “coercion” in a way that allows you to differentiate between cases of coercion that you approve of and cases of coercion that you oppose. This is the crux of the issue. > It's not my opinion, it's Proudhon's, and we've already discussed it. If you wish to continue to engage this point then I will go dredge up his writing in more detail. I’d prefer it if you restated the relevant parts in your own words. > Why is payment any more a concern- or an outrage- than punitive laws that force people to conform to public morality? Are you asking what difference there is between a system where one person works to produce food that is unilaterally expropriated via violence and threats and a system where community norms permit the forceful removal of people who insist on copulating in public? If you insist, in the case of the former, there is a hierarchical relation that specifies that some people work to produce things of value, and other people have the discretion of determining who is entitled to the benefit of that value. In the other case you have norms that apply to everyone (in accordance with egalitarian principles) and specify a response that is intended to remedy the unwanted phenomenon (rather than punish the offender or deter unwanted conduct). > Why are coercive claims on labor less valid than coercive claims on capital? Who says they are? > Okay, then rebrand taxes as citizenship fees or community funding and this entire discussion is rendered moot. The rebranding doesn’t solve the problem, as the problem is the essential nature of the activity, not whatever label is applied to it. > Again, you seem to have a singleminded conception of taxes as something that is inherently coercive, possibly because of real-world oppressive and opaque tax regimes, rather than considering that people might actually voluntarily pay taxes, because they do want the public services and functions of government that their tax money is funding. If its voluntary then its a consensual transaction, and not coerced, and not taxation. This is well understood and if you’re in agreement then we can agree to have an opt-out system of “taxation.” > And if you argue that there's a lot that you never agreed to funding, then I agree with you, but that's an implementation issue, not an argument from first principles conjured from pure logic in Plato's world of forms. I can agree with this. > So really that's what it all boils down to. Taxation is oppressive language. We should call them public donations instead. This only works if you remove the coercion part, as I have been saying.

Apocryphon 6y ago
> It doesn’t substantiate your claim that taxation is inescapable. It wasn't intended as substantiative, but for rhetorical effect. > This is the crux of the issue. The crux of the issue is that coercion can be defined to fit any situation. Is a mutual agreement truly free if it is detrimental to one side? Can it be argued that such agreements are made under duress, and thus coercive? Because if so, then most "agreements" are not free. And it can be reduced, ad absurdum that there are no agreement is truly free. > I’d prefer it if you restated the relevant parts in your own words. I would prefer not to. > If you insist, in the case of the former, there is a hierarchical relation that specifies that some people work to produce things of value, and other people have the discretion of determining who is entitled to the benefit of that value. In the other case you have norms that apply to everyone (in accordance with egalitarian principles) and specify a response that is intended to remedy the unwanted phenomenon (rather than punish the offender or deter unwanted conduct). That is actually a well-founded answer. Of course, the quibble would be the claim that "other people have the discretion". In the case of public morality, "other people" is behind it as well. The decision was always out of your hands- or on another hand, in a participatory democracy, it was always in your hands as a member of society. > Who says they are? I don't see you attacking labor regulations, environmental regulations, etc. hamstringing capital with the same fervor. Why all of this concern for labor and not for capital? > not whatever label is applied to it And yet you seem to define taxation as inherently coercive even when harvest sharing is interpreted as a form of it. Furthermore, >> One dominant factor has to do with the basic nature of the foraging mode of production. Systematic scroungers have no way to force nonscroungers into remaining in the band and continuing to pay what is in effect a tax. And, of course, a community of nonscroungers would have the ability to force a persistent scrounger to change his behavior as a condition of remaining in the band. >> Because members of hunter-gather bands have no effective means of engaging in a long-run system of coercive transfers, Dowling concludes that reciprocation in some form must eventually occur, or the band will likely dissolve. Here again the free- dom of association and mobility plays an important role in understanding hunter- gatherer behavior. Nonreciprocators are not likely to be tolerated in a band of reciprocators. And an entire band of nonreciprocators is unlikely to have evolutionary success. https://www.independent.org/pdf/tir/tir_16_04_01_mayor.pdf https://www.independent.org/pdf/tir/tir_16_04_01_mayor.pdf pg. 494-495 So there you have it. Forager societies do experience coercion, and indeed are built upon reciprocity which necessarily includes coercion: either unnamed punishment in the case of the Yanomamo or the Seneca, or the threat of exile from the band (and thus the forfeiture of survival). > This is well understood and if you’re in agreement then we can agree to have an opt-out system of “taxation.” It would still likely be called taxes because the usual focus on taxes is on the utility of the revenue and not on the compulsory element. Such a voluntary system would be indeed an ideal one to work towards, in the same way direct digital democracy or holacracy might also be admirable goals of decentralization, personal autonomy, and the abolishment of hierarchy. In the meantime, however, it seems to be a perfection of the current system, in the same way that direct democracy would be a refinement of the bureaucratic proxied system of representative democracy. That's because such a system would not be absolutely free of coercion, but only a minimization of it. Consensual transactions can be made under duress, as aforementioned, and such transactions are still structured in ways to include punitive measure for bad actors who break transactions. Therefore there is still violence in the system, merely less of it.

Apocryphon 6y ago

> It doesn’t substantiate your claim that taxation is inescapable. It wasn't intended as substantiative, but for rhetorical effect. > This is the crux of the issue. The crux of the issue is that coercion can be defined to fit any situation. Is a mutual agreement truly free if it is detrimental to one side? Can it be argued that such agreements are made under duress, and thus coercive? Because if so, then most "agreements" are not free. And it can be reduced, ad absurdum that there are no agreement is truly free. > I’d prefer it if you restated the relevant parts in your own words. I would prefer not to. > If you insist, in the case of the former, there is a hierarchical relation that specifies that some people work to produce things of value, and other people have the discretion of determining who is entitled to the benefit of that value. In the other case you have norms that apply to everyone (in accordance with egalitarian principles) and specify a response that is intended to remedy the unwanted phenomenon (rather than punish the offender or deter unwanted conduct). That is actually a well-founded answer. Of course, the quibble would be the claim that "other people have the discretion". In the case of public morality, "other people" is behind it as well. The decision was always out of your hands- or on another hand, in a participatory democracy, it was always in your hands as a member of society. > Who says they are? I don't see you attacking labor regulations, environmental regulations, etc. hamstringing capital with the same fervor. Why all of this concern for labor and not for capital? > not whatever label is applied to it And yet you seem to define taxation as inherently coercive even when harvest sharing is interpreted as a form of it. Furthermore, >> One dominant factor has to do with the basic nature of the foraging mode of production. Systematic scroungers have no way to force nonscroungers into remaining in the band and continuing to pay what is in effect a tax. And, of course, a community of nonscroungers would have the ability to force a persistent scrounger to change his behavior as a condition of remaining in the band. >> Because members of hunter-gather bands have no effective means of engaging in a long-run system of coercive transfers, Dowling concludes that reciprocation in some form must eventually occur, or the band will likely dissolve. Here again the free- dom of association and mobility plays an important role in understanding hunter- gatherer behavior. Nonreciprocators are not likely to be tolerated in a band of reciprocators. And an entire band of nonreciprocators is unlikely to have evolutionary success. https://www.independent.org/pdf/tir/tir_16_04_01_mayor.pdf https://www.independent.org/pdf/tir/tir_16_04_01_mayor.pdf pg. 494-495 So there you have it. Forager societies do experience coercion, and indeed are built upon reciprocity which necessarily includes coercion: either unnamed punishment in the case of the Yanomamo or the Seneca, or the threat of exile from the band (and thus the forfeiture of survival). > This is well understood and if you’re in agreement then we can agree to have an opt-out system of “taxation.” It would still likely be called taxes because the usual focus on taxes is on the utility of the revenue and not on the compulsory element. Such a voluntary system would be indeed an ideal one to work towards, in the same way direct digital democracy or holacracy might also be admirable goals of decentralization, personal autonomy, and the abolishment of hierarchy. In the meantime, however, it seems to be a perfection of the current system, in the same way that direct democracy would be a refinement of the bureaucratic proxied system of representative democracy. That's because such a system would not be absolutely free of coercion, but only a minimization of it. Consensual transactions can be made under duress, as aforementioned, and such transactions are still structured in ways to include punitive measure for bad actors who break transactions. Therefore there is still violence in the system, merely less of it.