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> It demonstrates that taxes are inescapable It demonstrates the hypocrisy of Washington et al. It doesn’t demonstrate inescapability of anything. > Yes, for

> It demonstrates that taxes are inescapable It demonstrates the hypocrisy of Washington et al. It doesn’t demonstrate inescapability of anything. > Yes, for the definition of coercion! Feel free to include the definition when you substantiate your assertion. > See upthread. I responded to your assertion upthread, you have yet to substantiate your opinion that property necessarily implies violence. Are you able to do so? > But not all forms of taxation are based on income or wealth. There are consumptive taxes. There are taxes that are more akin to fees. And all taxes can also be expressed as membership fees for citizenship, irrespective of economic value. The common thread being the fact that a person extracts a payment through threat of violence. > Sales taxes and VAT surely aren't. Land value taxes are not. You are conflating all forms of taxation with income or wealth taxes. Those are also unilateral coercive claims on a nonconsenti g person’s labor. > Civil courts can levy penalties. Are those penalties coercive, or are they agreed by those who agree to be bound by the court? Then, are taxes coercive, or agreed to those who agree to accept citizenship? Both are coercive in the current system. Neither are necessarily coercive except insofar as calling them taxes implies that they are coerced. Its possible to have voluntary citizenship and voluntary dispute resolution. > Harvest sharing in hunter-gatherer societies takes the form of implicit taxes Use of the word taxation implies that they’re coerced but the anthropological literature suggests that this is voluntary. Foragers lack the ability to coerce payments from each other to any significant degree.

Apocryphon 6y ago
> It demonstrates the hypocrisy of Washington et al. It doesn’t demonstrate inescapability of anything. P’raps. But at least it's a case study from history. > Feel free to include the definition when you substantiate your assertion. It is difficult to agree on a definition, because once you suggest that any law with punitive measures is invalid, no matter how light the punishment is or how innocuous the law is, you can denounce anything from taxation to property rights to jaywalking as built on coercion. > Are you able to do so? It's not my opinion, it's Proudhon's, and we've already discussed it. If you wish to continue to engage this point then I will go dredge up his writing in more detail. > The common thread being the fact that a person extracts a payment through threat of violence. > Those are also unilateral coercive claims on a nonconsenti g person’s labor. Why is payment any more a concern- or an outrage- than punitive laws that force people to conform to public morality? Or prevent business owners from treating their labor as they see fit? Is it any more robbery to force a factory owner to pay a tax, than it is to forbid them from conducting business free of government regulations? Or any other law? Why are coercive claims on labor less valid than coercive claims on capital? > Neither are necessarily coercive except insofar as calling them taxes implies that they are coerced. Okay, then rebrand taxes as citizenship fees or community funding and this entire discussion is rendered moot. > Its possible to have voluntary citizenship and voluntary dispute resolution. Again, you seem to have a singleminded conception of taxes as something that is inherently coercive, possibly because of real-world oppressive and opaque tax regimes, rather than considering that people might actually voluntarily pay taxes, because they do want the public services and functions of government that their tax money is funding. And if you argue that there's a lot that you never agreed to funding, then I agree with you, but that's an implementation issue, not an argument from first principles conjured from pure logic in Plato's world of forms. > Use of the word taxation implies that they’re coerced but the anthropological literature suggests that this is voluntary. So really that's what it all boils down to. Taxation is oppressive language. We should call them public donations instead.
- chordalkeyboard 6y ago
  > But at least it's a case study from history. It doesn’t substantiate your claim that taxation is inescapable. > It is difficult to agree on a definition, because once you suggest that any law with punitive measures is invalid, no matter how light the punishment is or how innocuous the law is, you can denounce anything from taxation to property rights to jaywalking as built on coercion. I agree that it is difficult to define “coercion” in a way that allows you to differentiate between cases of coercion that you approve of and cases of coercion that you oppose. This is the crux of the issue. > It's not my opinion, it's Proudhon's, and we've already discussed it. If you wish to continue to engage this point then I will go dredge up his writing in more detail. I’d prefer it if you restated the relevant parts in your own words. > Why is payment any more a concern- or an outrage- than punitive laws that force people to conform to public morality? Are you asking what difference there is between a system where one person works to produce food that is unilaterally expropriated via violence and threats and a system where community norms permit the forceful removal of people who insist on copulating in public? If you insist, in the case of the former, there is a hierarchical relation that specifies that some people work to produce things of value, and other people have the discretion of determining who is entitled to the benefit of that value. In the other case you have norms that apply to everyone (in accordance with egalitarian principles) and specify a response that is intended to remedy the unwanted phenomenon (rather than punish the offender or deter unwanted conduct). > Why are coercive claims on labor less valid than coercive claims on capital? Who says they are? > Okay, then rebrand taxes as citizenship fees or community funding and this entire discussion is rendered moot. The rebranding doesn’t solve the problem, as the problem is the essential nature of the activity, not whatever label is applied to it. > Again, you seem to have a singleminded conception of taxes as something that is inherently coercive, possibly because of real-world oppressive and opaque tax regimes, rather than considering that people might actually voluntarily pay taxes, because they do want the public services and functions of government that their tax money is funding. If its voluntary then its a consensual transaction, and not coerced, and not taxation. This is well understood and if you’re in agreement then we can agree to have an opt-out system of “taxation.” > And if you argue that there's a lot that you never agreed to funding, then I agree with you, but that's an implementation issue, not an argument from first principles conjured from pure logic in Plato's world of forms. I can agree with this. > So really that's what it all boils down to. Taxation is oppressive language. We should call them public donations instead. This only works if you remove the coercion part, as I have been saying.

Apocryphon 6y ago

> It demonstrates the hypocrisy of Washington et al. It doesn’t demonstrate inescapability of anything. P’raps. But at least it's a case study from history. > Feel free to include the definition when you substantiate your assertion. It is difficult to agree on a definition, because once you suggest that any law with punitive measures is invalid, no matter how light the punishment is or how innocuous the law is, you can denounce anything from taxation to property rights to jaywalking as built on coercion. > Are you able to do so? It's not my opinion, it's Proudhon's, and we've already discussed it. If you wish to continue to engage this point then I will go dredge up his writing in more detail. > The common thread being the fact that a person extracts a payment through threat of violence. > Those are also unilateral coercive claims on a nonconsenti g person’s labor. Why is payment any more a concern- or an outrage- than punitive laws that force people to conform to public morality? Or prevent business owners from treating their labor as they see fit? Is it any more robbery to force a factory owner to pay a tax, than it is to forbid them from conducting business free of government regulations? Or any other law? Why are coercive claims on labor less valid than coercive claims on capital? > Neither are necessarily coercive except insofar as calling them taxes implies that they are coerced. Okay, then rebrand taxes as citizenship fees or community funding and this entire discussion is rendered moot. > Its possible to have voluntary citizenship and voluntary dispute resolution. Again, you seem to have a singleminded conception of taxes as something that is inherently coercive, possibly because of real-world oppressive and opaque tax regimes, rather than considering that people might actually voluntarily pay taxes, because they do want the public services and functions of government that their tax money is funding. And if you argue that there's a lot that you never agreed to funding, then I agree with you, but that's an implementation issue, not an argument from first principles conjured from pure logic in Plato's world of forms. > Use of the word taxation implies that they’re coerced but the anthropological literature suggests that this is voluntary. So really that's what it all boils down to. Taxation is oppressive language. We should call them public donations instead.

chordalkeyboard 6y ago
> But at least it's a case study from history. It doesn’t substantiate your claim that taxation is inescapable. > It is difficult to agree on a definition, because once you suggest that any law with punitive measures is invalid, no matter how light the punishment is or how innocuous the law is, you can denounce anything from taxation to property rights to jaywalking as built on coercion. I agree that it is difficult to define “coercion” in a way that allows you to differentiate between cases of coercion that you approve of and cases of coercion that you oppose. This is the crux of the issue. > It's not my opinion, it's Proudhon's, and we've already discussed it. If you wish to continue to engage this point then I will go dredge up his writing in more detail. I’d prefer it if you restated the relevant parts in your own words. > Why is payment any more a concern- or an outrage- than punitive laws that force people to conform to public morality? Are you asking what difference there is between a system where one person works to produce food that is unilaterally expropriated via violence and threats and a system where community norms permit the forceful removal of people who insist on copulating in public? If you insist, in the case of the former, there is a hierarchical relation that specifies that some people work to produce things of value, and other people have the discretion of determining who is entitled to the benefit of that value. In the other case you have norms that apply to everyone (in accordance with egalitarian principles) and specify a response that is intended to remedy the unwanted phenomenon (rather than punish the offender or deter unwanted conduct). > Why are coercive claims on labor less valid than coercive claims on capital? Who says they are? > Okay, then rebrand taxes as citizenship fees or community funding and this entire discussion is rendered moot. The rebranding doesn’t solve the problem, as the problem is the essential nature of the activity, not whatever label is applied to it. > Again, you seem to have a singleminded conception of taxes as something that is inherently coercive, possibly because of real-world oppressive and opaque tax regimes, rather than considering that people might actually voluntarily pay taxes, because they do want the public services and functions of government that their tax money is funding. If its voluntary then its a consensual transaction, and not coerced, and not taxation. This is well understood and if you’re in agreement then we can agree to have an opt-out system of “taxation.” > And if you argue that there's a lot that you never agreed to funding, then I agree with you, but that's an implementation issue, not an argument from first principles conjured from pure logic in Plato's world of forms. I can agree with this. > So really that's what it all boils down to. Taxation is oppressive language. We should call them public donations instead. This only works if you remove the coercion part, as I have been saying.