You make a good point. I think there are two levels of security sales, if you will. One is junior//mid level to junior//mid level, and one is CISO<>CIO, and th

You make a good point. I think there are two levels of security sales, if you will. One is junior//mid level to junior//mid level, and one is CISO<>CIO, and they both handle different pushes that play their own, sort of non-overlapping role in company risk management. The CISO<>CIO thing falls right into the bucket that you're mentioning... big architectural changes need much more going for them than good salesmanship from security. If there's not a major benefit for the enterprise in non-sec areas by doing changes like ZTA, or a lot of precedent at this point about a SIEM/SOC just being something one has, it's an uphill battle. That said, a lot of these breaches, like the Equifax admin:admin, isn't so much a "for the stock price, this is a net positive we'll run the risk for" type of decision that security loses. A lot of this is just patiently needling/selling to dev and IT teams about finally rotating a pw to something complex, for instance. That happens successfully.... attackers try another IP door on the internet and perhaps Equifax doesn't happen (using the theory that Equifax wasn't from an APT, which is of course a different situation). Of course insane change management boards exist, but in many cases it's just that easy of a fix. My theory is even more relevant when you look at SaaS vendors, like SolarWinds, as really driving govt's innovation edge and by extension being the vector into the environments. In those cases, the security team's political capital is even stronger, as smaller companies mean much more cross-org influence is possible. Sometimes, it's just flipping "min pw complexity" as a radio button in AWS's IAM console, and no one is the wiser. When so many attacks source to these very easy wins to fix, that's where the salesmanship is lacking (or can really help) for sec. To your point about "12 months and everyone forgets," that's not the case for the SaaS vendors working in a crowded space providing generic products. While the pool of possible vendors is shrunk by like how many SaaS vendors bother to pass FEDRAMP, and/or you stack on contractual inertia, there is still a pool. SolarWinds doesn't really provide that exceptionally unique of a product, and they got the entire Fed Govt pwned. That'll be >12 month impact for them. If it's not, I owe you a beer. This is even more pronounced of a motivator across the legion of SaaS vendors who have their first handful of serious clients, but a sec incident w/o a seriously embedded platform blows them up.