I think in this case the problem wasn't because of some inherent characteristics of the software. If this was completely analog, mechanical tool, the problem c

I think in this case the problem wasn't because of some inherent characteristics of the software. If this was completely analog, mechanical tool, the problem could still have existed. For example, you could have made a mistake using various knobs and switches. And in this case the solution was to physically design the device so that it is not possible to put it in an incorrect state. Thus it did not matter much if there was a software error as whatever software did would not make it possible to put the beam and the metal shield in an incorrect state. Using physical safeties is a common strategy. For example, my Instant Pot has multiple physical safeties built in. For example: * even if the controlling software or sensor fails, there is overpressure valve that will not let the pressure rise over certain value. * there is a single piece of metal that both blocks gasses escaping from the pot AND blocks ability to open the pot. If the piece of metal is not in place, there is a hole in the pot and pressure cannot rise. If the piece of metal is in place so the hole is closed, it blocks possibility of opening the pot and creating an explosion. * there is a specially designed guide that makes it impossible to close the device only partly * the device is designed so that the weakest element keeping pressure is the seal. If the pressure rises, instead of the pot blowing up the seal will deform, be blown off and let the steam escape in more or less controlled manner. * there is a bimetal safety device that will turn off the heater if temperature rises too much, and so on. You see, none of these features relies on software. There are software safeties but they are redundant in that device does not rely solely on them. If the company producing Instant Pot can show this kind of safety-conscious design I am sure it can also be applied to dangerous medical devices.